[STATE LAW · DC]
District of Columbia personal injury law for plaintiff firms
The District of Columbia rules that shape a personal-injury file, from the notice to the District to the lien payoff. Each rule is cited to the D.C. Code section, court rule or opinion it comes from.
On this page
District of Columbia at a glance
| Topic | Rule | Short answer |
|---|---|---|
| Limitations | Personal injury | 3 years |
| Limitations | Wrongful death | 2 years from death |
| Limitations | Property damage | 3 years |
| Limitations | Claims against local government | Notice within 6 months |
| Limitations | Minors | Tolled until 18 |
| Limitations | Medical malpractice | 3 years + 90-day notice |
| Limitations | Improvements to real property (repose) | 10 years from substantial completion |
| Comparative fault | Fault model | Contributory (any fault bars) |
| Comparative fault | Joint and several liability | Equal (pro rata) shares |
| Comparative fault | Settlement credit | Pro rata (joint tortfeasor) |
| Comparative fault | Pedestrians and cyclists | Bars only if fault exceeds defendants' |
| Medical damages | Recoverable amount | Billed (write-offs recoverable) |
| Medical damages | Collateral source rule | Common-law rule applies |
| Records & bills affidavits | Business-records certification | Certification + reasonable notice |
| Records & bills affidavits | Cost-and-necessity affidavit | No statute |
| Copy fees | Paper copies | 88¢/page + postage |
| Copy fees | Electronic copies | $22.88 + 66¢/page, $86.54 cap |
| Copy fees | Response deadline | 30 days (60 with written reason) |
| Copy fees | HIPAA patient-access fee | Reasonable, cost-based |
| Copy fees | HIPAA response deadline | 30 days |
| Hospital liens | Who has a lien | Hospitals |
| Hospital liens | Perfection and notice | Notice filed before payment |
| Hospital liens | Amount and caps | Reasonable and necessary charges |
| Hospital liens | Releases and liability | Payer liable for 1 year |
| Medicaid liens | State recovery right | Direct action and lien |
| Medicaid liens | Notice to the state | Notice + 30 days before paying |
| Medicaid liens | Allocation (Ahlborn/Wos) | Statute: share representing care |
| UM / UIM | Coverage unless rejected | Offered; no written rejection needed |
| UM / UIM | Uninsured motorist minimum | $25,000 / $50,000 |
| UM / UIM | Offset or excess | Offset (reduced by liability limits) |
| UM / UIM | Stacking | Policy may prohibit |
| UM / UIM | Consent to settle | 60-day notice |
| Time-limited demands | Demand statute | No statute |
| Time-limited demands | Bad-faith failure to settle | No first-party tort; third-party open |
| Premises | Duty model | Reasonable care (lawful entrants) |
| Damages caps | Non-economic damages (general PI) | No cap |
| Damages caps | Non-economic damages (medical malpractice) | No cap |
| Damages caps | Punitive damages | Clear and convincing proof |
| Damages caps | Claims against government | No punitive damages |
Statute of limitations
The District of Columbia has no separate personal-injury line in its limitations statute: most injury claims fall under the three-year catch-allSource 1 (8): D.C. Code § 12-301. Claims against the District government need written notice within six months, long before limitations runsSource 3 (a): D.C. Code § 12-309.
Personal injury
3 years
In the District of Columbia, an action “for which a limitation is not otherwise specially prescribed” must be brought within three years from the time the right to maintain the action accrues, and personal-injury claims are brought under that catch-allSource 1 (8): D.C. Code § 12-301.
- Shorter periods in the same section apply to some intentional torts; libel, for example, has one yearSource 1 (4): D.C. Code § 12-301. When a claim accrues (the discovery rule) is case law.
Wrongful death
2 years from death
In the District of Columbia, a wrongful-death action is brought in the name of the decedent's personal representative within two years after the death of the injured personSource 6 § 16-2702: D.C. Code § 16-2702.
- The period was extended from one year to two in 2012; the code annotations seen in search excerpts name the amending act inconsistently (D.C. Law 19-177 or 19-147). No action lies under the death statute if the injured person recovered damages during their lifetimeSource 5 § 16-2701: D.C. Code § 16-2701.
Property damage
3 years
In the District of Columbia, an action for damages for an injury to real or personal property must be brought within three yearsSource 1 (3): D.C. Code § 12-301.
Claims against local government
Notice within 6 months
In the District of Columbia, an action against the District for unliquidated damages to person or property may not be maintained unless, within six months after the injury or damage was sustained, the claimant gives the Mayor written notice of the approximate time, place, cause and circumstances of the injury or damageSource 3 (a): D.C. Code § 12-309. “A report in writing by the Metropolitan Police Department, in regular course of duty, is a sufficient notice under this section”Source 3 (a): D.C. Code § 12-309.
- The District government is both the state-level and the local government defendant, so this notice rule is the one to check for any claim against it. How strictly courts read the notice's contents, and whether any excuse applies, is case law.
Minors
Tolled until 18
In the District of Columbia, a person who is under 18 years of age when the right of action accrues may bring the action within the ordinary limitations period after the disability is removedSource 2 (a): D.C. Code § 12-302.
- The same section covers a person who is non compos mentis or imprisoned when the claim accruesSource 2 (a): D.C. Code § 12-302. Whether minority tolling also extends a parent's claim for the child's medical expenses is case law.
Medical malpractice
3 years + 90-day notice
In the District of Columbia, medical-malpractice claims fall under the three-year catch-all periodSource 1 (8): D.C. Code § 12-301, and the intended defendant must be given notice of intention to file suit not less than 90 days before the action is filedSource 7 § 16-2802: D.C. Code § 16-2802.
- In the District of Columbia, if notice is served within 90 days before limitations expires, the time to file is extended 90 days from the date of serviceSource 8 § 16-2803: D.C. Code § 16-2803. The notice requirement does not apply to an intended defendant whose name is unknown or who is unlicensed, and the court may waive it for good-faith efforts or in the interests of justiceSource 9 § 16-2804: D.C. Code § 16-2804.
Improvements to real property (repose)
10 years from substantial completion
In the District of Columbia, a statute of repose bars claims for injury caused by a defective or unsafe improvement to real property that occurs more than ten years after the improvement was substantially completedSource 4 § 12-310: D.C. Code § 12-310; the District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld the statute's constitutionalitySource 30 at 733, 736: Sandoe v. Lefta Associates, 559 A.2d 732 (D.C. 1988).
Comparative fault
The District of Columbia is a contributory-negligence jurisdiction: any negligence by the plaintiff that contributes to the injury bars recoverySource 27 at 687: Wingfield v. Peoples Drug Store, Inc., 379 A.2d 685 (D.C. 1977). A statute carves out pedestrians, cyclists and other vulnerable road users hit by motor vehiclesSource 10 (a): D.C. Code § 50-2204.52.
Fault model
Contributory (any fault bars)
In the District of Columbia, “the District of Columbia does not recognize different degrees of contributory negligence. The rule is simply that contributory negligence bars a plaintiff's recovery”Source 27 at 687: Wingfield v. Peoples Drug Store, Inc., 379 A.2d 685 (D.C. 1977).
- Exceptions such as last clear chance, and the defendant's burden of proof on the defence, are case law not covered here.
Joint and several liability
Equal (pro rata) shares
In the District of Columbia, because contributory negligence is the rule, joint tortfeasors are deemed equally at fault and share damages pro rata, not by percentage of faultSource 28 at 1253 n.15: Berg v. Footer, 673 A.2d 1244 (D.C. 1996).
- Whether each joint tortfeasor is liable to the plaintiff for the whole judgment was not read in an opinion for this page.
Settlement credit
Pro rata (joint tortfeasor)
In the District of Columbia, “whenever the plaintiff settles with a joint tortfeasor, the nonsettling defendant shall receive a pro rata credit … reflecting the defendant's equitable right to contribution and no more,” even if the plaintiff's total recovery then exceeds the verdictSource 28 at 1245: Berg v. Footer, 673 A.2d 1244 (D.C. 1996). A settlement with a party that is not a joint tortfeasor earns a dollar-for-dollar (pro tanto) credit, and an uncontested stipulation of the settling defendant's liability makes it a joint tortfeasor for this purposeSource 28 at 1245: Berg v. Footer, 673 A.2d 1244 (D.C. 1996).
- When both kinds of credit apply, the pro tanto credit is subtracted from the verdict before the remainder is divided into pro rata sharesSource 28 at 1258: Berg v. Footer, 673 A.2d 1244 (D.C. 1996).
Pedestrians and cyclists
Bars only if fault exceeds defendants'
In the District of Columbia, the negligence of a pedestrian or vulnerable user of a public highway or sidewalk involved in a collision with a motor vehicle bars recovery only if it is a proximate cause of the injury and is “greater than the aggregated total negligence of all the defendants that proximately caused the plaintiff's injury”Source 10 (a): D.C. Code § 50-2204.52.
- The Vulnerable User Collision Recovery Amendment Act of 2020 rewrote subsection (a), replacing the original “non-motorized user” category with “vulnerable user” (including bicycles, scooters, motorcycles and personal mobility devices) and adding collisions with another vulnerable userSource 11 amending § 50-2204.52(a): D.C. Law 23-183 (Vulnerable User Collision Recovery Amendment Act of 2020). Which collisions the current text reaches, and whether it applies to cases pending at its effective date.
Medical expenses: billed, paid or incurred
In the District of Columbia, a plaintiff with health insurance may recover medical bills including amounts the providers wrote off under the insurer's negotiated rates; the collateral source rule keeps those write-offs from reducing damagesSource 29 at 984: Hardi v. Mezzanotte, 818 A.2d 974 (D.C. 2003).
Recoverable amount
Billed (write-offs recoverable)
In the District of Columbia, a plaintiff who paid for private health insurance may recover medical expenses written off by providers under the insurer's negotiated discounts, because those write-offs are a collateral-source benefit of the plaintiff's insurance bargainSource 29 at 984: Hardi v. Mezzanotte, 818 A.2d 974 (D.C. 2003).
- Hardi involved private insurance the plaintiff paid for. Whether the same applies to Medicaid, Medicare or uninsured treatment is a separate question.
Collateral source rule
Common-law rule applies
In the District of Columbia, “payments to the injured party from a collateral source are not allowed to diminish damages recoverable from the wrongdoer”; the rule applies when a payment came from a source wholly independent of the tortfeasor or the plaintiff may be said to have contracted for the prospect of a double recoverySource 29 at 984: Hardi v. Mezzanotte, 818 A.2d 974 (D.C. 2003).
Proving medical records and bills
In the District of Columbia, a certification from the records custodian or another qualified person makes a business record, including a medical record, self-authenticating, provided the other side gets reasonable written notice before the hearingSource 19 (b), (c): D.C. Code § 14-508. No billing-affidavit statute was found, but medical bills may be admitted without direct testimony that the charges were reasonableSource 35 at 62 n.5: Montgomery v. Dennis, 411 A.2d 61 (D.C. 1980).
Business-records certification
Certification + reasonable notice
In the District of Columbia, the original or a copy of a domestic record of a regularly conducted activity, “as shown by a certification of the custodian or another qualified person, shall be deemed authentic without further testimony as evidence in any judicial proceeding or administrative hearing”Source 19 (b): D.C. Code § 14-508. A certification is “a written declaration under oath subject to the penalty of perjury” and need not take the form of an affidavitSource 19 (a): D.C. Code § 14-508.
- Before the proceeding, the proponent must give the adverse party reasonable written notice of the intent to offer the record and make the record and certification available for inspectionSource 19 (c): D.C. Code § 14-508. The record must still meet the business-record elements (made at or near the time by someone with knowledge, kept in the regular course, made as a regular practice), and the opponent can defeat it by showing a lack of trustworthiness. The section was added by the Business Records Efficiency Act of 2022Source 20 § 2: D.C. Law 24-261 (Business Records Efficiency Act of 2022). Superior Court Civil Rule 43-I also governs business records and photographic copies. Check the local rules and any standing order for your court.
Cost-and-necessity affidavit
No statute
The District of Columbia has no billing-affidavit statute like Texas's § 18.001. Instead, under District of Columbia case law, “medical bills may be admitted into evidence without direct testimony establishing their reasonableness”Source 35 at 62 n.5: Montgomery v. Dennis, 411 A.2d 61 (D.C. 1980).
- Montgomery treats bills as part of a prima facie case on the nature of the treatment and the amount incurredSource 35 at 62 n.5: Montgomery v. Dennis, 411 A.2d 61 (D.C. 1980). Proving that the treatment was necessary and was caused by the incident is a separate question.
Medical record copy fees and deadlines
In the District of Columbia, a statute caps what a health care entity may charge a person the patient has authorized (such as the patient's lawyer) for medical records, and sets a 30-day production deadlineSource 21 § 3-1210.12: D.C. Code § 3-1210.12. The dollar amounts in the Code text are adjusted; the DC Department of Health publishes a current scheduleSource 22 2024 schedule: DC Health, Medical Records 2024 Fees. Federal HIPAA limits apply when the patient requests their own records; how they interact with the District statute is not addressed here.
Paper copies
88¢/page + postage
In the District of Columbia, for records produced on paper to an authorized person, a health care entity may charge a per-page fee not exceeding 88 cents plus the actual cost of postage and handling, and the listed fees “are the only fees” it may chargeSource 21 (b): D.C. Code § 3-1210.12.
- DC Health's 2024 schedule lists $0.91 per page for non-electronic records and a $23.70 search and handling feeSource 22 2024 schedule: DC Health, Medical Records 2024 Fees.
Electronic copies
$22.88 + 66¢/page, $86.54 cap
In the District of Columbia, for electronic records produced to an authorized person, a health care entity may charge a $22.88 search and handling fee, “even if no personal medical record is located,” plus a per-page fee not exceeding 66 cents, with a total not exceeding $86.54Source 21 (b): D.C. Code § 3-1210.12.
- DC Health's 2024 schedule lists $23.70 for search and handling, $0.68 per page and a $89.66 cap for electronic recordsSource 22 2024 schedule: DC Health, Medical Records 2024 Fees.
Response deadline
30 days (60 with written reason)
In the District of Columbia, a health care entity must send the authorized person a complete and current copy of the record within 30 days of receiving the request; if it cannot, it must state in writing the reason and the date the record will be produced, and must produce it within 60 days of the requestSource 21 (c): D.C. Code § 3-1210.12.
- For each day of non-compliance the entity must reduce its fee by $15, up to the fee it would otherwise charge, unless it has a legal basis for withholding the recordSource 21 (d): D.C. Code § 3-1210.12.
HIPAA patient-access fee
Reasonable, cost-based
Under federal HIPAA rules, when an individual requests a copy of their own records, a covered entity may charge only “a reasonable, cost-based fee” covering labor for copying, supplies, postage and any agreed summarySource 37 (c)(4): 45 C.F.R. § 164.524.
HIPAA response deadline
30 days
Under federal HIPAA rules, a covered entity “must act on a request for access no later than 30 days after receipt of the request”Source 37 (b)(2)(i): 45 C.F.R. § 164.524, with one extension available on the conditions the rule setsSource 37 (b)(2)(ii): 45 C.F.R. § 164.524.
Hospital and provider liens
In the District of Columbia, a hospital has a lien on the patient's share of an accident recovery for its reasonable and necessary charges, but only after it files written notice with the Recorder of DeedsSource 12 § 40-201: D.C. Code § 40-201; Source 13 § 40-202: D.C. Code § 40-202.
Who has a lien
Hospitals
In the District of Columbia, a hospital that treats an accident victim has a lien on the part “going or belonging to such patient” of any recovery, by judgment or settlement, from the party liable for the injurySource 12 § 40-201: D.C. Code § 40-201. The lien does not apply to injuries covered by the District's employees' or workers' compensation actsSource 12 § 40-201: D.C. Code § 40-201.
- No physician or other non-hospital provider lien surfaced in the searches for this page.
Perfection and notice
Notice filed before payment
In the District of Columbia, the hospital lien is not effective unless written notice, giving the injured person's name and address, the accident date, the hospital's name and location and the name of the party alleged to be liable, is filed with the Recorder of Deeds before the damages are paidSource 13 § 40-202: D.C. Code § 40-202.
Amount and caps
Reasonable and necessary charges
In the District of Columbia, the hospital lien covers “the reasonable and necessary charges of such hospital for the treatment, care, and maintenance of such patient in such hospital up to the date of payment of such damages”Source 12 § 40-201: D.C. Code § 40-201.
- No percentage-of-recovery cap appeared in the excerpts seen; the full section was not read.
Releases and liability
Payer liable for 1 year
In the District of Columbia, a person who pays damages after a lien notice is filed without paying the hospital's lien remains liable to the hospital for the amount it was entitled to receive “for a period of one year”Source 14 § 40-203: D.C. Code § 40-203.
Medicaid recovery
In the District of Columbia, the District can sue the liable third party directly for what it paid for an injured beneficiary's careSource 16 § 4-602: D.C. Code § 4-602, and it holds a lien on the part of a judgment or settlement that represents that care, perfected by a notice filed with the Recorder of DeedsSource 18 (a): D.C. Code § 4-607. Before paying out, the third party must give the District notice and 30 daysSource 17 (c): D.C. Code § 4-606.
State recovery right
Direct action and lien
In the District of Columbia, when the District pays for care of a beneficiary whose injury creates third-party liability, it has a direct cause of action against the third party for the unreimbursed cost of that careSource 16 § 4-602: D.C. Code § 4-602. “Third party” includes a tortfeasor and its insurerSource 15 § 4-601: D.C. Code § 4-601.
- Where the beneficiary bears the costs and fees of pursuing the claim, the Mayor sets a good-faith contribution that is subtracted from the lienSource 18 (b): D.C. Code § 4-607.
Notice to the state
Notice + 30 days before paying
In the District of Columbia, before satisfying the remainder of a beneficiary's judgment or settlement, a third party must give the Mayor written notice and 30 calendar days from receipt of that notice, so the District can decide whether to perfect its lienSource 17 (c): D.C. Code § 4-606.
- The Mayor perfects the lien by filing written notice with the Recorder of Deeds before payment to the beneficiary and serving copies on the beneficiary, the third party and, where known, the insurerSource 18 (a): D.C. Code § 4-607. A beneficiary, third party or insurer that disposes of lien-covered funds after notice can be liable to the District for one year from the dispositionSource 18 (e): D.C. Code § 4-607.
Allocation (Ahlborn/Wos)
Statute: share representing care
In the District of Columbia, the District's lien attaches to the amount of the judgment or settlement that represents the care and treatment it provided or paid for as health-care assistanceSource 18 (a): D.C. Code § 4-607. Federal Medicaid law likewise limits recovery to the portion of a settlement that represents payments for medical careSource 33 at 282: Arkansas Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (2006), and does not allow an irrebuttable, one-size-fits-all allocation presumptionSource 34 at 639: Wos v. E.M.A., 568 U.S. 627 (2013).
- No District procedure for contesting the allocation (such as a hearing or a formula) was found.
Uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage
In the District of Columbia, uninsured motorist coverage is mandatory, underinsured coverage must be made available, and the policy may bar stackingSource 24 (c-1), (f): D.C. Code § 31-2406. A 2026 act adds “enhanced” underinsured coverage that is not reduced by the at-fault driver's paymentSource 26 § 31-2406: D.C. Law 26-155 (Motor Vehicle Insurance Modernization Amendment Act of 2026). Before accepting a policy-limits offer, the claimant gives the underinsured motorist carrier 60 days to preserve subrogation by paying the limits itselfSource 25 § 31-2407.01: D.C. Code § 31-2407.01.
Coverage unless rejected
Offered; no written rejection needed
In the District of Columbia, an insurer must make underinsured motorist coverage available up to the policy's uninsured motorist limits; once the insured has rejected it, the insurer need not reoffer it, and “the insurer shall not be required to obtain or maintain written rejections of the underinsured motor vehicle coverage”Source 24 (c-1): D.C. Code § 31-2406.
- D.C. Law 26-155 (Motor Vehicle Insurance Modernization Amendment Act of 2026) rewrites § 31-2406. Insurers must include “enhanced” underinsured motorist coverage unless the insured waives it, and that coverage may not exceed the policy's uninsured motorist coverageSource 26 § 31-2406: D.C. Law 26-155 (Motor Vehicle Insurance Modernization Amendment Act of 2026). Reports also describe phased increases to the minimum limits.
Uninsured motorist minimum
$25,000 / $50,000
In the District of Columbia, required uninsured motorist coverage is at least $25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident, with higher limits available at the named insured's request; an uninsured vehicle includes one whose insurer denies coverage or becomes insolventSource 24 (f): D.C. Code § 31-2406.
Offset or excess
Offset (reduced by liability limits)
In the District of Columbia, a vehicle is “underinsured” when its liability limits are insufficient to pay the loss up to the insured's uninsured motorist limitSource 23 (32A): D.C. Code § 31-2402, and underinsured benefits are subject to the same set-off provisions as uninsured motorist coverageSource 24 (c-1): D.C. Code § 31-2406.
- The 2026 “enhanced” underinsured coverage instead pays its limit without reduction for the amount paid to the insured, once the at-fault party's liability policies, bonds and securities are exhaustedSource 26 § 31-2406: D.C. Law 26-155 (Motor Vehicle Insurance Modernization Amendment Act of 2026).
Stacking
Policy may prohibit
In the District of Columbia, insurance that includes underinsured motorist coverage “may include terms and conditions that preclude stacking of underinsured motor vehicle coverage”Source 24 (c-1): D.C. Code § 31-2406. A parallel provision covers uninsured motorist coverage.
Consent to settle
60-day notice
In the District of Columbia, when the at-fault driver's insurer offers its full bodily-injury limits in exchange for a release, the claimant or that insurer must give the claimant's underinsured motorist carrier written notice of the offer by certified mail, return receipt requested; the carrier is deemed to waive subrogation unless, within 60 days of receiving the notice, it gives written notice that it does not waive and pays the claimant an amount equal to the offered limitsSource 25 § 31-2407.01: D.C. Code § 31-2407.01.
- If the carrier pays, it is subrogated to the claimant's rights against the at-fault driver up to the amount paid, and the payment does not increase the underinsured motorist limits; if it does neither within 60 days, the claimant may complete the settlementSource 25 § 31-2407.01: D.C. Code § 31-2407.01. The notice must identify the claimant, the at-fault driver, that driver's insurer and policy, and the offer.
Time-limited and policy-limits demands
The District of Columbia has no time-limited demand statute. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has declined to create a tort of first-party bad faith, while leaving room for fiduciary duties when an insurer handles a third-party settlementSource 32 at 1087, 1090 n.15: Choharis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 961 A.2d 1080 (D.C. 2008).
Demand statute
No statute
The District of Columbia has no statute setting the contents or minimum open period of a time-limited settlement demand. The underinsured-motorist notice procedure in § 31-2407.01 is a separate step that applies when the at-fault driver's insurer offers its limitsSource 25 § 31-2407.01: D.C. Code § 31-2407.01.
Bad-faith failure to settle
No first-party tort; third-party open
In the District of Columbia, the Court of Appeals declined to recognize a tort of bad faith in an insurer's handling of its own insured's claim, treating the dispute as contractSource 32 at 1087: Choharis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 961 A.2d 1080 (D.C. 2008), but it did “not exclude the possibility of fiduciary principles coming into play in certain third-party situations, such as where the insurance company is involved in a settlement of a third-party claim”Source 32 at 1090 n.15: Choharis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 961 A.2d 1080 (D.C. 2008).
- Whether a District of Columbia liability insurer is liable for an excess judgment after refusing a reasonable policy-limits demand is not settled by Choharis.
Premises liability
Duty model
Reasonable care (lawful entrants)
“In the District of Columbia the applicable standard for determining whether an owner or occupier of land has exercised the proper level of care to a person lawfully upon his premises is reasonable care under all of the circumstances”Source 30 at 738: Sandoe v. Lefta Associates, 559 A.2d 732 (D.C. 1988).
- The District of Columbia abolished the invitee/licensee distinction but, in Holland v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 431 A.2d 597 (D.C. 1981) (en banc), declined to extend the reasonable-care standard to trespassersSource 30 at 738–39: Sandoe v. Lefta Associates, 559 A.2d 732 (D.C. 1988).
Damages caps
The District of Columbia has no statute capping compensatory damages in personal-injury or medical-malpractice cases. Punitive damages must be proved by clear and convincing evidenceSource 31 at 932: Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Breeden, 665 A.2d 929 (D.C. 1995), and the District government itself is not liable for themSource 36 at 832: Smith v. District of Columbia, 336 A.2d 831 (D.C. 1975) (per curiam).
Non-economic damages (general PI)
No cap
The District of Columbia has no statute capping non-economic damages in general personal-injury cases.
Non-economic damages (medical malpractice)
No cap
The District of Columbia has no statute capping non-economic damages in medical-malpractice cases; the medical-malpractice chapter of the D.C. Code sets pre-suit notice requirements but no damages limitSource 7 § 16-2802: D.C. Code § 16-2802.
Punitive damages
Clear and convincing proof
In the District of Columbia, entitlement to punitive damages requires proof by clear and convincing evidence; punitive damages do not survive the tortfeasor's death; and a plaintiff who relies on the defendant's wealth must prove the defendant's current net worthSource 31 at 932: Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Breeden, 665 A.2d 929 (D.C. 1995).
Claims against government
No punitive damages
In the District of Columbia, “[a]bsent extraordinary circumstances,” the District government “is not liable for punitive damages,” because no statute authorizes themSource 36 at 832: Smith v. District of Columbia, 336 A.2d 831 (D.C. 1975) (per curiam). No statute capping compensatory damages against the District was found.
- Claims against the District also need the six-month written notice to the MayorSource 3 (a): D.C. Code § 12-309.
General information for plaintiff-side law firms, not legal advice. District of Columbia law changes: check the current statute and case law before relying on this page.
Sources
D.C. Code § 12-301 · Council of the District of Columbia, D.C. Code (currency unverified)
“for which a limitation is not otherwise specially prescribed”
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D.C. Code § 12-302 · Council of the District of Columbia, D.C. Code (currency unverified)
“under 18 years of age”
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D.C. Code § 12-309 · Council of the District of Columbia, D.C. Code (currency unverified)
“A report in writing by the Metropolitan Police Department, in regular course of duty, is a sufficient notice under this section.”
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D.C. Code § 12-310 · Council of the District of Columbia, D.C. Code (currency unverified)
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D.C. Code § 16-2701 · Council of the District of Columbia, D.C. Code (currency unverified)
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D.C. Code § 16-2702 · Council of the District of Columbia, D.C. Code (currency unverified)
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D.C. Code § 16-2802 · Council of the District of Columbia, D.C. Code (currency unverified)
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D.C. Code § 16-2803 · Council of the District of Columbia, D.C. Code (currency unverified)
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D.C. Code § 16-2804 · Council of the District of Columbia, D.C. Code (currency unverified)
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D.C. Code § 50-2204.52 · Council of the District of Columbia, D.C. Code (currency unverified)
“greater than the aggregated total negligence of all the defendants that proximately caused the plaintiff's injury”
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D.C. Law 23-183 (Vulnerable User Collision Recovery Amendment Act of 2020) · Council of the District of Columbia, D.C. Code (currency unverified)
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D.C. Code § 40-201 · Council of the District of Columbia, D.C. Code (currency unverified)
“the reasonable and necessary charges of such hospital for the treatment, care, and maintenance of such patient in such hospital up to the date of payment of such damages”
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D.C. Code § 40-202 · Council of the District of Columbia, D.C. Code (currency unverified)
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D.C. Code § 40-203 · Council of the District of Columbia, D.C. Code (currency unverified)
“for a period of one year”
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D.C. Code § 4-601 · Council of the District of Columbia, D.C. Code (currency unverified)
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D.C. Code § 4-602 · Council of the District of Columbia, D.C. Code (currency unverified)
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D.C. Code § 4-606 · Council of the District of Columbia, D.C. Code (currency unverified)
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D.C. Code § 4-607 · Council of the District of Columbia, D.C. Code (currency unverified)
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D.C. Code § 14-508 · Council of the District of Columbia, D.C. Code (currency unverified)
“The original or copy of a domestic record of a regularly conducted activity, as shown by a certification of the custodian or another qualified person, shall be deemed authentic without further testimony as evidence in any judicial proceeding or administrative hearing.”
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D.C. Law 24-261 (Business Records Efficiency Act of 2022) · Council of the District of Columbia, D.C. Code (currency unverified)
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D.C. Code § 3-1210.12 · Council of the District of Columbia, D.C. Code (currency unverified)
“The fees enumerated in subsection (b) of this section are the only fees that a health care entity may charge an authorized person for the production of a personal medical record”
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DC Health, Medical Records 2024 Fees · DC Department of Health (seen in a search excerpt only)
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D.C. Code § 31-2402 · Council of the District of Columbia, D.C. Code (currency unverified)
“are insufficient to pay the loss up to the limit of uninsured motor vehicle coverage as requested by the insured”
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D.C. Code § 31-2406 · Council of the District of Columbia, D.C. Code (currency unverified)
“The insurer shall not be required to obtain or maintain written rejections of the underinsured motor vehicle coverage.”
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D.C. Code § 31-2407.01 · Council of the District of Columbia, D.C. Code (currency unverified)
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D.C. Law 26-155 (Motor Vehicle Insurance Modernization Amendment Act of 2026) · Council of the District of Columbia, D.C. Code (currency unverified)
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Wingfield v. Peoples Drug Store, Inc., 379 A.2d 685 (D.C. 1977) · District of Columbia Court of Appeals, read in the Caselaw Access Project reporter files (static.case.law)
“the District of Columbia does not recognize different degrees of contributory negligence. The rule is simply that contributory negligence bars a plaintiff's recovery.”
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Berg v. Footer, 673 A.2d 1244 (D.C. 1996) · District of Columbia Court of Appeals, read in the Caselaw Access Project reporter files (static.case.law)
“whenever the plaintiff settles with a joint tortfeasor, the nonsettling defendant shall receive a pro rata credit under Martello, reflecting the defendant's equitable right to contribution and no more”
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Hardi v. Mezzanotte, 818 A.2d 974 (D.C. 2003) · District of Columbia Court of Appeals, read in the Caselaw Access Project reporter files (static.case.law)
“Under the collateral source rule, payments to the injured party from a collateral source are not allowed to diminish damages recoverable from the wrongdoer.”
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Sandoe v. Lefta Associates, 559 A.2d 732 (D.C. 1988) · District of Columbia Court of Appeals, read in the Caselaw Access Project reporter files (static.case.law)
“In the District of Columbia the applicable standard for determining whether an owner or occupier of land has exercised the proper level of care to a person lawfully upon his premises is reasonable care under all of the circumstances.”
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Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Breeden, 665 A.2d 929 (D.C. 1995) · District of Columbia Court of Appeals, read in the Caselaw Access Project reporter files (static.case.law)
“we adopt the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof for punitive damages”
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Choharis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 961 A.2d 1080 (D.C. 2008) · District of Columbia Court of Appeals, read in the Caselaw Access Project reporter files (static.case.law)
“We do not exclude the possibility of fiduciary principles coming into play in certain third-party situations, such as where the insurance company is involved in a settlement of a third-party claim or directs the actual course of the defense.”
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Arkansas Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (2006) · Supreme Court of the United States, read in the Caselaw Access Project reporter files (static.case.law)
“the federal third-party liability provisions require an assignment of no more than the right to recover that portion of a settlement that represents payments for medical care”
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Wos v. E.M.A., 568 U.S. 627 (2013) · Supreme Court of the United States, read in the Caselaw Access Project reporter files (static.case.law)
“An irrebuttable, one-size-fits-all statutory presumption is incompatible with the Medicaid Act's clear mandate that a State may not demand any portion of a beneficiary's tort recovery except the share that is attributable to medical expenses.”
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Montgomery v. Dennis, 411 A.2d 61 (D.C. 1980) · District of Columbia Court of Appeals, read in the Caselaw Access Project reporter files (static.case.law)
“It is settled law in this jurisdiction that medical bills may be admitted into evidence without direct testimony establishing their reasonableness.”
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Smith v. District of Columbia, 336 A.2d 831 (D.C. 1975) (per curiam) · District of Columbia Court of Appeals, read in the Caselaw Access Project reporter files (static.case.law)
“Absent extraordinary circumstances not present here, we agree with the weight of authority and conclude the District of Columbia is not liable for punitive damages.”
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45 C.F.R. § 164.524 · eCFR (up to date as of 2026-11-03)
“the covered entity must act on a request for access no later than 30 days after receipt of the request”
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