[STATE LAW · MA]

Massachusetts personal injury law for plaintiff firms

The Massachusetts rules that shape a personal-injury file, from the first records request to the lien payoff. Each rule is cited to the General Law or Supreme Judicial Court opinion it comes from.

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Massachusetts at a glance

Massachusetts: the short answers (details and sources below)
TopicRuleShort answer
LimitationsPersonal injury and property damage3 years
LimitationsWrongful death3 years from death
LimitationsClaims against public employersPresent within 2 years; sue within 3
LimitationsMinors and incapacityTolled until disability removed
Comparative negligenceBar to recovery51% bar
Comparative negligenceJoint and several liabilityJoint and several (common law)
Comparative negligenceSettling and absent tortfeasorsFault compared among trial parties only
Medical expensesBilled amounts are admissibleBilled admissible; range-of-payments evidence allowed
Medical expensesMedical malpractice offsetOffset in med-mal
§ 79G affidavitsWhat a § 79G bill or report provesReasonable charge and necessity
§ 79G affidavitsTen-day notice10 days, certified mail
Copy feesFee caps$15 + $0.50/page (first 100), $0.25/page after
Copy feesBenefit-claim requestsNo fee; 30 days
Hospital liensNotice perfects the lienWritten notice before resolution
Hospital liensPayer liability and itemized statements10 days to itemize
MassHealth liensNotice within 10 days10 calendar days
MassHealth liensAllocationCodified presumption; allocation can be challenged
UM / UIMUM coverage is requiredRequired
UM / UIMUnderinsured coverage: difference in limitsOffset (gap between limits)
UM / UIMNo stackingNo stacking
UM / UIMConsent to settle with the tortfeasorConsent clause valid; insurer must prove prejudice
93A / 176DPrivate right of action and 30-day demand30-day demand letter
93A / 176DMultiple damagesDouble or treble the judgment
PremisesLawful visitorsUnified reasonable-care standard
PremisesTrespassersAdults: wilful, wanton or reckless only
PremisesRecreational useWilful, wanton or reckless only
Damages capsMedical malpractice$500,000 general damages (with exceptions)
Damages capsPublic employers$100,000; no punitive damages
Damages capsPunitive damages in wrongful deathAt least $5,000 (statutory)
Damages capsPunitive damages generallyOnly where a statute authorizes

Statute of limitations

Most Massachusetts personal-injury claims share one three-year period, but claims against public employers add a two-year presentment step before suit. The rules below are located from the General LawsSource 1: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2A.

Personal injury and property damage

3 years

In Massachusetts, except as otherwise provided, actions of tort and actions of contract to recover for personal injuries must be commenced within three years after the cause of action accruesSource 1: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2A.

  • In Massachusetts, malpractice actions against physicians and hospitals have their own section, with a three-year period and a seven-year outer limitSource 2: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 4.
  • In Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court adopted a discovery rule for malpractice, holding that the claim does not “accrue” under § 4 “until a patient learns, or reasonably should have learned, that he has been harmed as a result of a defendant’s conduct”Source 29 at 611 (opening of opinion): Franklin v. Albert, 381 Mass. 611 (1980). How far the discovery rule reaches other § 2A torts was not read here.

Wrongful death

3 years from death

In Massachusetts, a wrongful-death action must be commenced within three years from the date of death, or within three years from when the executor or administrator knew, or with reasonable diligence should have known, the factual basis for the claimSource 4: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 229, § 2. The action is brought in tort by the executor or administratorSource 4: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 229, § 2.

Claims against public employers

Present within 2 years; sue within 3

Under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, a claimant must first present the claim in writing to the public employer's executive officer within two years after the cause of action arose, and may sue only after the claim is finally deniedSource 6: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 4. A failure to deny the claim in writing within six months counts as a final denial, and the civil action must be brought within three years after the cause of action accruedSource 6: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 4.

  • In Massachusetts, for claims against the Commonwealth and its agencies, presentment to the attorney general is sufficient; for a city or town, § 4 names officials such as the mayor, city manager, town manager or town counselSource 6: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 4.
  • In Massachusetts, § 4 carves out claims against public employers relating to the sexual abuse of a minor, which follow ch. 260, § 4C½ instead; the carve-out was added by Acts of 2014, c. 145Source 6: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 4.
  • A 2025 House bill that would rewrite §§ 1–14 of chapter 258 (H.1724, 194th General Court) was not enacted as filed: the bill history shows it accompanied a study order (H.5281) on 3/26/2026.

Minors and incapacity

Tolled until disability removed

In Massachusetts, if the person entitled to sue was a minor or was incapacitated by mental illness when the claim accrued, the action may be commenced within the period otherwise allowed after the disability is removedSource 3: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 7.

  • In Massachusetts, § 7 does not govern a minor's malpractice claim: notwithstanding § 7, such a claim must be commenced within three years from accrual, a child under six has until the ninth birthday, and an outer limit of seven years appliesSource 27: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 60D.
  • Whether § 7 tolling applies to Tort Claims Act presentment under ch. 258, § 4.

Comparative negligence

Massachusetts compares the plaintiff's negligence with the combined negligence of all defendants: a plaintiff can recover if their share is not greater than the defendants' total, with damages reduced by that share. The rule is in G.L. c. 231, § 85Source 7: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 85.

Bar to recovery

51% bar

In Massachusetts, contributory negligence does not bar recovery for negligence resulting in death or injury to person or property if the plaintiff's negligence was not greater than the total negligence of the persons against whom recovery is soughtSource 7: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 85; the Supreme Judicial Court quoted that text, as rewritten in 1973, in Shantigar Foundation v. Bear Mountain BuildersSource 30 at 131, part 2: Shantigar Foundation v. Bear Mountain Builders, 441 Mass. 131 (2004).

Reduction and comparison

In Massachusetts, damages are diminished in proportion to the plaintiff's negligence, and each plaintiff's negligence is compared to the total negligence of all persons against whom recovery is soughtSource 7: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 85Source 30 at 131, part 2: Shantigar Foundation v. Bear Mountain Builders, 441 Mass. 131 (2004). The statute also abolishes assumption of risk as a defense and presumes the plaintiff exercised due care, placing the burden of proving negligence on the party asserting itSource 7: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 85.

Joint tortfeasors and settlements

In Massachusetts, a good-faith release of one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury does not discharge the others unless its terms say so, but reduces the claim against them by the greater of the amount stipulated or the consideration paidSource 8 § 4(a): Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231B, and discharges the settling tortfeasor from liability for contributionSource 8 § 4(b): Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231B. Contribution shares are pro rata, without regard to relative degrees of faultSource 8 § 2: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231B.

Joint and several liability

Joint and several (common law)

In Massachusetts, joint and several liability is retained: the Supreme Judicial Court said that “[u]nder our current system of joint and several liability, a plaintiff injured by more than one tortfeasor may sue any or all of them for her full damages”Source 30 at 131, part 2: Shantigar Foundation v. Bear Mountain Builders, 441 Mass. 131 (2004). Earlier, it repeated that wrongdoers whose concurrent negligence causes inseparable damages “are jointly and severally liable”Source 31 at 586: O'Connor v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 401 Mass. 586 (1988).

Settling and absent tortfeasors

Fault compared among trial parties only

In Massachusetts, the jury compares the plaintiff's negligence only with that of the defendants against whom recovery is sought at trial; the Supreme Judicial Court held that a tortfeasor who settled before trial is not placed on the verdict slip, noting that the statute “does not direct the jury to apportion negligence among all tortfeasors who may have caused the injury, only those against whom recovery ‘is’ sought”Source 30 at 131, part 2: Shantigar Foundation v. Bear Mountain Builders, 441 Mass. 131 (2004). The settlement then reduces the claim against the others under ch. 231B, § 4Source 8 § 4(a): Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231B.

Medical expenses: billed amounts and the collateral source rule

Massachusetts has no paid-or-incurred statute. The Supreme Judicial Court held that § 79G makes full medical bills admissible, while the defense may show the range of payments the provider accepts. The holding is in Law v. GriffithSource 11: Law v. Griffith, 457 Mass. 349 (2010).

Billed amounts are admissible

Billed admissible; range-of-payments evidence allowed

In Massachusetts, a judge may not exclude medical bills offered under § 79G because the provider accepted a lower amount; the Supreme Judicial Court held that the statute “does not authorize exclusion of such evidence”Source 11 part 2(a): Law v. Griffith, 457 Mass. 349 (2010). The Court also held that “evidence of amounts actually paid to the plaintiff’s medical providers is not admissible, but evidence may be introduced concerning the range of payments that the providers accept for the types of medical services that the plaintiff received”Source 11 part 2(b): Law v. Griffith, 457 Mass. 349 (2010).

Collateral source rule

In Massachusetts, the collateral source rule is common law; the Supreme Judicial Court in Law v. Griffith described its purpose as “tort deterrence”Source 11 part 2(b)(ii): Law v. Griffith, 457 Mass. 349 (2010).

Medical malpractice offset

Offset in med-mal

In Massachusetts malpractice actions, the court reduces an award by amounts covered by collateral sources, less premiums the plaintiff paid for those benefits in the year before the action accruedSource 9 (b): Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 60G; a collateral source may not recover that amount back from the plaintiff, subject to federal subrogation rightsSource 9 (c): Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 60G, and public assistance is excluded from the reductionSource 9 (e): Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 60G.

Medical bills, records and § 79G

Massachusetts lets sworn itemized bills and medical reports in without the provider testifying, if the ten-day certified-mail notice is given. Hospital records come in separately under G.L. c. 233, § 79. Both are restated in the Massachusetts Guide to EvidenceSource 14 §§ 803(6)(B)–(C), 902(k)–(l): Mass. G. Evid. §§ 803(6), 902 (2026 ed.).

What a § 79G bill or report proves

Reasonable charge and necessity

In Massachusetts, an itemized bill and reports, including hospital medical records, for medical, dental, hospital services, prescriptions or orthopedic appliances for an injured person, sworn under the penalties of perjury by the provider or an authorized agent of the hospital or HMO, are admissible as evidence of the fair and reasonable charge for the services or their necessitySource 12 first para., first sentence: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 233, § 79G; the Supreme Judicial Court quoted that first sentence in Law v. GriffithSource 11 part 2(b)(i): Law v. Griffith, 457 Mass. 349 (2010). The statute also makes reports admissible on diagnosis, prognosis and causation opinions of the treating physician or dentistSource 12 first para.: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 233, § 79G.

Ten-day notice

10 days, certified mail

In Massachusetts, the party offering a § 79G bill or report must give written notice of intent to offer it, with a copy, by certified mail, return receipt requested, at least ten days before introducing it, and file an affidavit of notice with the return receipt with the clerkSource 12: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 233, § 79GSource 14 § 902(l): Mass. G. Evid. §§ 803(6), 902 (2026 ed.).

Hospital records under § 79

In Massachusetts, hospital records may be admitted in the court's discretion so far as they relate to treatment and medical history, but not on the question of liability, and certified copies may be admitted when the custodian certifies them as true and completeSource 13: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 233, § 79. The Guide to Evidence treats records certified by the custodian's affidavit as self-authenticatingSource 14 § 902(k): Mass. G. Evid. §§ 803(6), 902 (2026 ed.).

General business records

Under the Massachusetts Guide to Evidence, a business record is not excluded as hearsay if the court finds it was made in good faith, in the regular course of business, and before the proceeding began; the witness need not be the designated records keeperSource 14 § 803(6)(A): Mass. G. Evid. §§ 803(6), 902 (2026 ed.).

Medical-record copy fees

Massachusetts caps what hospitals, clinics and other providers may charge for record copies, with a per-request base fee and a lower per-page rate after 100 pages. The caps are in G.L. c. 111, § 70Source 15: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 111, § 70.

Fee caps

$15 + $0.50/page (first 100), $0.25/page after

In Massachusetts, a reasonable fee for hospital or clinic record copies is capped at a base charge of $15 per request, plus $0.50 per page for the first 100 pages and $0.25 per page after thatSource 15: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 111, § 70, which may be adjusted by the consumer price index for medical care servicesSource 15: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 111, § 70.

  • No published CPI-adjusted figure was found.
  • For a patient's own access request to a HIPAA covered entity, federal law separately limits the fee to a reasonable, cost-based fee covering only copying labor, supplies, postage and any agreed summarySource 37 (c)(4): 45 C.F.R. § 164.524 (HIPAA right of access). How the federal limit and the § 70 caps interact for a given request.

Who may get copies

In Massachusetts, a hospital or clinic must let the patient, or the patient's attorney on delivery of the patient's written authorization, inspect the records and receive a copy on payment of a reasonable feeSource 15: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 111, § 70. Other licensed providers must furnish copies to the patient or an authorized representative for the same reasonable feeSource 16: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 112, § 12CC.

Benefit-claim requests

No fee; 30 days

In Massachusetts, no fee may be charged for records requested to support a claim or appeal under the Social Security Act or a federal or state needs-based benefit program, if the requester presents reasonable documentation, and the provider must furnish such records within thirty days of the requestSource 15: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 111, § 70Source 16: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 112, § 12CC.

  • No Massachusetts response deadline for ordinary patient or attorney requests was found in the excerpts. Under federal law, a HIPAA covered entity must act on a patient's own access request within 30 days of receipt, with one 30-day extension if it gives written reasons and a completion dateSource 37 (b)(2): 45 C.F.R. § 164.524 (HIPAA right of access).
  • Senate bill S.1624 (194th General Court) would replace the per-page charges with a base fee of up to $15 per request plus up to $10 per storage device, and up to $50 base for an authorized third party; no bill history was shown.

Hospital liens

Massachusetts gives hospitals, and HMOs and medical or dental service corporations that paid benefits, a lien on the injured person's recovery, but only after written notice before the case resolves. The lien is in G.L. c. 111, §§ 70A–70DSource 17: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 111, § 70A.

What the lien reaches

In Massachusetts, the lien attaches to the net amount payable to the injured person from a judgment, settlement or compromise with the person liable, an attorney's lien takes precedence over it, and it does not cover charges incurred after the judgment, settlement or compromiseSource 17: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 111, § 70A.

Notice perfects the lien

Written notice before resolution

In Massachusetts, the lien is effective only if written notice, naming the injured person, the accident date, the treating provider and the person alleged to be liable, is sent by certified mail, return receipt requested, before any judgment, settlement or compromise, to the injured person, their attorney, the person alleged liable and that person's liability insurerSource 18: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 111, § 70B.

Payer liability and itemized statements

10 days to itemize

In Massachusetts, a person who pays out lien-subject money after receiving § 70B notice is liable to the lienholder, but not beyond the net amount paid to the injured personSource 19: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 111, § 70C. A notice recipient may request a certified itemized statement of charges by certified mail; if the hospital does not supply it within ten days, the lien is dissolvedSource 20: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 111, § 70D.

  • House bill H.1129 (194th General Court), referred to the Financial Services committee, would amend § 70D to bar HMOs and medical or disability insurers from claiming more than a proportionate share of a tort recovery and let a court review allocations; no committee report or enactment was shown.

MassHealth recovery

Massachusetts requires a MassHealth recipient, or their attorney, to tell the Executive Office of Health and Human Services early about a third-party claim, and gives that office a lien on the recovery. The rules are in G.L. c. 118E, § 22Source 21: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 118E, § 22.

Notice within 10 days

10 calendar days

In Massachusetts, the claimant, or the claimant's attorney if represented, must notify the Executive Office of Health and Human Services in writing within 10 calendar days of starting recovery steps such as an insurance claim or demand letter, or a civil actionSource 21 (j): Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 118E, § 22, and no settlement or award may be made final without written notice to the office and a reasonable opportunity to intervene or perfect its rightsSource 21 (j): Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 118E, § 22.

The lien

In Massachusetts, applying for and receiving recoverable MassHealth benefits operates, after notice to the third party, as a lien on money the third party may provide, up to the amount of those benefits, and can reach funds in the claimant's attorney's hands after notice to the attorneySource 21 (g): Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 118E, § 22.

Allocation

Codified presumption; allocation can be challenged

In Massachusetts, the claimant must repay the office from the portion of a settlement, judgment or award allocated to medical expenses, reaching the future-medical allocation if the past-medical portion falls shortSource 21 (b): Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 118E, § 22. When the settlement, judgment or award does not specify the medical portion, it is presumed to apply first to medical expenses up to the medical assistance benefits paidSource 21 (c): Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 118E, § 22, and the office may dispute an allocation that yields less than full recovery and ask a court for a hearing, before or after the third party paysSource 21 (d): Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 118E, § 22.

  • How this presumption squares with Ahlborn and Wos limits on Medicaid recovery from non-medical damages.

Uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage

Massachusetts requires UM coverage on policies for vehicles registered in the state and lets the insured elect underinsured coverage, which pays only the gap between limits. The rules are in G.L. c. 175, § 113LSource 22: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 175, § 113L.

UM coverage is required

Required

In Massachusetts, a motor vehicle policy for a vehicle registered in the state must include uninsured motorist coverage in the amounts set for bodily injury liability under chapter 175, for insured persons legally entitled to recover from uninsured owners or operatorsSource 22 (1): Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 175, § 113L.

Underinsured coverage: difference in limits

Offset (gap between limits)

In Massachusetts, underinsured coverage applies when the at-fault vehicle's bodily injury limit is less than the insured's UM limit, and only to the extent the UM limits exceed the at-fault limitsSource 22 (2): Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 175, § 113L, and only if the policyholder elected that coverageSource 22 (2): Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 175, § 113L.

  • MacInnis v. Aetna (1988) applied an earlier version of § 113L and described underinsured benefits as payable on top of the tortfeasor's limitsSource 32 at 220, part 2: MacInnis v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 403 Mass. 220 (1988); read it against the current difference-in-limits text.
  • Senate bill S.748 (194th General Court) would extend (2) to cases where multiple claims from one accident reduce the tortfeasor's available limits below the insured's limit; no bill history was shown.

No stacking

No stacking

In Massachusetts, the limits for two or more vehicles or two or more policies may not be added together, combined or stackedSource 22 (5): Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 175, § 113L.

Insurer's share of the tort recovery

In Massachusetts, a UM/UIM insurer that pays is entitled to proceeds of the insured's recovery from the responsible party only once the insured has received full compensation for their injuriesSource 22 (4): Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 175, § 113L.

Consent to settle with the tortfeasor

Consent clause valid; insurer must prove prejudice

In Massachusetts, a consent-to-settlement clause in the UIM part of a policy is valid, but an insurer that wants to deny UIM benefits because the insured settled without consent must prove material prejudice from the breachSource 32 at 220, part 1: MacInnis v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 403 Mass. 220 (1988). Where the tortfeasor has substantial assets, the insurer may preserve its rights after notice of a proposed settlement by paying the insured an amount equal to the tentative settlement plus the UIM benefits due before the tortfeasor is released, then pursuing the tortfeasor itself (a Schmidt v. Clothier procedure)Source 32 at 220, part 3(b): MacInnis v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 403 Mass. 220 (1988); the insurer may not unreasonably withhold consentSource 32 at 220, part 3(a): MacInnis v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 403 Mass. 220 (1988).

  • No statutory consent-to-settle procedure appeared in the § 113L excerpts, and the current standard Massachusetts auto policy wording was not read.

Settlement demands and unfair settlement practices

In Massachusetts, the main tool against an insurer that will not make a fair offer is the unfair claim settlement practices statute, enforced through a chapter 93A demand and suit. The rules are in G.L. c. 176D, § 3(9) and c. 93A, § 9Source 24: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9.

Failure to settle when liability is reasonably clear

In Massachusetts, it is an unfair claim settlement practice to fail to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clearSource 23 (9)(f): Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 176D, § 3, or to delay settling one part of a claim to influence settlement under another coverage where liability is reasonably clearSource 23 (9)(m): Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 176D, § 3.

Private right of action and 30-day demand

30-day demand letter

In Massachusetts, a person whose rights are affected by a violation of chapter 176D, § 3(9) may sue under chapter 93A, § 9, after sending a written demand for relief at least thirty days before filingSource 24 (1), (3): Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9.

Multiple damages

Double or treble the judgment

In Massachusetts, damages under § 9 may be doubled or trebled for a willful or knowing violation or a bad-faith refusal to grant relief after demand, and the amount multiplied is the judgment on all claims arising out of the same underlying transaction or occurrence, regardless of available insuranceSource 24 (3): Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9. A reasonable tender of settlement in response to the demand can limit recoverySource 24 (3): Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9.

Single-claim violations and the measure of damages

In Massachusetts, one ongoing failure to settle a single claim can be actionable; the Supreme Judicial Court held that “a claim such as the plaintiff’s, comprising an ongoing, but single, violation, can be actionable under G. L. c. 176D, § 3 (9) (f), and G. L. c. 93A, §§ 2 and 9”Source 33 at 556, part 1: Hopkins v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 434 Mass. 556 (2001). Where an insurer's violation injures the claimant, multiple damages are based on the underlying tort judgment, not on the claimant's loss of use of the settlement moneySource 34 at 486 (opening of opinion): Rhodes v. AIG Domestic Claims, Inc., 461 Mass. 486 (2012).

Time-limited demand statute

No Massachusetts statute governing time-limited or policy-limits demands was found: a targeted search of malegislature.gov returned only ch. 93A, § 9 and unrelated sections. Demand practice runs through the 93A demand letter and 176D duties above.

Premises claims

Massachusetts abolished the licensee–invitee distinction: an occupier owes all lawful visitors reasonable care in all the circumstances. The rule comes from Mounsey v. EllardSource 25: Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693 (1973).

Lawful visitors

Unified reasonable-care standard

In Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court held: “we no longer follow the common law distinction between licensees and invitees and, instead, create a common duty of reasonable care which the occupier owes to all lawful visitors”Source 25 opinion of the Court: Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693 (1973).

Trespassers

Adults: wilful, wanton or reckless only

In Massachusetts, a landowner owes an adult trespasser only the duty to refrain from “wilful, wanton or reckless disregard for the trespasser’s safety”; the Supreme Judicial Court declined to abolish the rule that a landowner is not liable to an adult trespasser for negligenceSource 35 at 244, opening of opinion: Schofield v. Merrill, 386 Mass. 244 (1982).

  • In Massachusetts, child trespassers are covered by statute: a landowner who maintains an artificial condition is liable for physical harm to trespassing children if it knows or has reason to know children are likely to trespass there, the condition poses an unreasonable risk of death or serious harm that children would not appreciate, the burden of removing the danger is slight compared with the risk, and the owner fails to use reasonable careSource 28: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 85Q.

Recreational use

Wilful, wanton or reckless only

In Massachusetts, a person who lawfully permits the public to use land for recreational purposes without imposing a charge is not liable for injuries to members of the public, including minors, absent wilful, wanton or reckless conductSource 26 (a): Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21, § 17C; the protection does not apply to an owner who charges a fee, and a voluntary donation not required for entry is not a feeSource 26: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21, § 17C.

Damages caps

Massachusetts has no general cap on personal-injury damages found in this review, but caps general damages in medical malpractice and limits public-employer liability. The med-mal cap is in G.L. c. 231, § 60HSource 10: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 60H.

Medical malpractice

$500,000 general damages (with exceptions)

In Massachusetts malpractice actions against health care providers, general damages such as pain and suffering, loss of companionship and embarrassment are capped at $500,000, unless the jury finds a substantial or permanent loss or impairment of a bodily function, substantial disfigurement, or other special circumstances that would deny just compensationSource 10: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 60H. The cap applies regardless of the number of jointly or severally liable defendants, and multiple plaintiffs' recoveries are reduced proportionallySource 10: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 60H.

Public employers

$100,000; no punitive damages

Under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, a public employer is not liable for prejudgment interest, punitive damages or any amount above $100,000Source 5: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 2, except that claims for serious bodily injury against the MBTA are not subject to the $100,000 limit on compensatory damagesSource 5: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 2.

Punitive damages in wrongful death

At least $5,000 (statutory)

In Massachusetts wrongful-death actions, punitive damages of not less than $5,000 may be awarded where the death was caused by malicious, wilful, wanton or reckless conduct or gross negligenceSource 4 cl. (3): Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 229, § 2.

Punitive damages generally

Only where a statute authorizes

In Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court has said that “[p]unitive damages are not allowed in this Commonwealth unless expressly authorized by statute”Source 36 at 805, part 3: Flesner v. Technical Communications Corp., 410 Mass. 805 (1991).

  • No court decision striking down the § 60H cap was found.

General information for plaintiff-side law firms, not legal advice. Massachusetts law changes: check the current statute and case law before relying on this page.

Sources

  1. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2A · Massachusetts Legislature (official; General Laws as shown on malegislature.gov, Nov. 2026)

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  2. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 4 · Massachusetts Legislature (official; General Laws as shown on malegislature.gov, Nov. 2026)

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  3. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 7 · Massachusetts Legislature (official; General Laws as shown on malegislature.gov, Nov. 2026)

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  4. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 229, § 2 · Massachusetts Legislature (official; General Laws as shown on malegislature.gov, Nov. 2026)

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  5. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 2 · Massachusetts Legislature (official; General Laws as shown on malegislature.gov, Nov. 2026)

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  6. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 4 · Massachusetts Legislature (official; General Laws as shown on malegislature.gov, Nov. 2026)

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  7. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 85 · Massachusetts Legislature (official; General Laws as shown on malegislature.gov, Nov. 2026)

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  8. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231B · Massachusetts Legislature (official; General Laws as shown on malegislature.gov, Nov. 2026)

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  9. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 60G · Massachusetts Legislature (official; General Laws as shown on malegislature.gov, Nov. 2026)

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  10. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 60H · Massachusetts Legislature (official; General Laws as shown on malegislature.gov, Nov. 2026)

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  11. Law v. Griffith, 457 Mass. 349 (2010) · Caselaw Access Project (static.case.law), read 2026-11-06

    “We conclude that evidence of amounts actually paid to the plaintiff’s medical providers is not admissible, but evidence may be introduced concerning the range of payments that the providers accept for the types of medical services that the plaintiff received.”

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  12. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 233, § 79G · Massachusetts Legislature (official; General Laws as shown on malegislature.gov, Nov. 2026)

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  13. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 233, § 79 · Massachusetts Legislature (official; General Laws as shown on malegislature.gov, Nov. 2026)

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  14. Mass. G. Evid. §§ 803(6), 902 (2026 ed.) · Supreme Judicial Court Advisory Committee on Massachusetts Evidence Law, mass.gov (official; 2026 edition)

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  15. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 111, § 70 · Massachusetts Legislature (official; General Laws as shown on malegislature.gov, Nov. 2026)

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  16. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 112, § 12CC · Massachusetts Legislature (official; General Laws as shown on malegislature.gov, Nov. 2026)

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  17. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 111, § 70A · Massachusetts Legislature (official; General Laws as shown on malegislature.gov, Nov. 2026)

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  18. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 111, § 70B · Massachusetts Legislature (official; General Laws as shown on malegislature.gov, Nov. 2026)

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  19. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 111, § 70C · Massachusetts Legislature (official; General Laws as shown on malegislature.gov, Nov. 2026)

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  20. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 111, § 70D · Massachusetts Legislature (official; General Laws as shown on malegislature.gov, Nov. 2026)

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  21. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 118E, § 22 · Massachusetts Legislature (official; General Laws as shown on malegislature.gov, Nov. 2026)

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  22. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 175, § 113L · Massachusetts Legislature (official; General Laws as shown on malegislature.gov, Nov. 2026)

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  23. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 176D, § 3 · Massachusetts Legislature (official; General Laws as shown on malegislature.gov, Nov. 2026)

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  24. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9 · Massachusetts Legislature (official; General Laws as shown on malegislature.gov, Nov. 2026)

    Checked

  25. Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693 (1973) · Caselaw Access Project (static.case.law), read 2026-11-06

    “Therefore, we no longer follow the common law distinction between licensees and invitees and, instead, create a common duty of reasonable care which the occupier owes to all lawful visitors.”

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  26. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21, § 17C · Massachusetts Legislature (official; General Laws as shown on malegislature.gov, Nov. 2026)

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  27. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 60D · Massachusetts Legislature (official; General Laws as shown on malegislature.gov, Nov. 2026)

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  28. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 85Q · Massachusetts Legislature (official; General Laws as shown on malegislature.gov, Nov. 2026)

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  29. Franklin v. Albert, 381 Mass. 611 (1980) · Caselaw Access Project (static.case.law), read in full 2026-11-07

    “We now overrule the decisions in Pasquale and Capucci and hold that a cause of action for medical malpractice does not “accrue” under G. L. c. 260, § 4, until a patient learns, or reasonably should have learned, that he has been harmed as a result of a defendant’s conduct.”

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  30. Shantigar Foundation v. Bear Mountain Builders, 441 Mass. 131 (2004) · Caselaw Access Project (static.case.law), read in full 2026-11-07

    “Under our current system of joint and several liability, a plaintiff injured by more than one tortfeasor may sue any or all of them for her full damages.”

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  31. O'Connor v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 401 Mass. 586 (1988) · Caselaw Access Project (static.case.law), read in full 2026-11-07

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  32. MacInnis v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 403 Mass. 220 (1988) · Caselaw Access Project (static.case.law), read in full 2026-11-07

    “The procedure for protecting these rights requires the policyholder to comply with the consent-to-settlement provision in the policy.”

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  33. Hopkins v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 434 Mass. 556 (2001) · Caselaw Access Project (static.case.law), read in full 2026-11-07

    Checked

  34. Rhodes v. AIG Domestic Claims, Inc., 461 Mass. 486 (2012) · Caselaw Access Project (static.case.law), read in full 2026-11-07

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  35. Schofield v. Merrill, 386 Mass. 244 (1982) · Caselaw Access Project (static.case.law), read in full 2026-11-07

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  36. Flesner v. Technical Communications Corp., 410 Mass. 805 (1991) · Caselaw Access Project (static.case.law), read in full 2026-11-07

    “Punitive damages are not allowed in this Commonwealth unless expressly authorized by statute.”

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  37. 45 C.F.R. § 164.524 (HIPAA right of access) · eCFR, Office of the Federal Register (official; read in full 2026-11-07)

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