[STATE LAW · WA]
Washington personal injury law for plaintiff firms
The Washington rules that shape a personal-injury file, from the claim notice to the lien payoff. Each rule names the RCW section, court rule or Washington opinion it comes from.
On this page
Washington at a glance
| Topic | Rule | Short answer |
|---|---|---|
| Limitations | Personal injury | 3 years |
| Limitations | Wrongful death | 3 years |
| Limitations | Property damage | 3 years (personal property) |
| Limitations | Medical negligence | 3 years or 1 year from discovery |
| Limitations | Claims against the State of Washington | Claim + 60 days before suit |
| Limitations | Claims against local governments | Claim + 60 days before suit |
| Limitations | Minors and incapacity | Tolled until 18 |
| Comparative fault | Fault model | Pure comparative fault |
| Comparative fault | Several liability as the default | Several only, with exceptions |
| Comparative fault | Fault-free claimant exception | Joint and several if claimant fault-free |
| Medical damages | Measure of medical damages | Reasonable value |
| Medical damages | Medical-negligence collateral source statute | Collateral source evidence allowed in med-mal |
| Records & ER 904 | Business records | Custodian or qualified witness |
| Records & ER 904 | Reasonableness and necessity still need proof | Bills alone are not proof |
| Copy fees | Response deadline | 15 working days |
| Copy fees | Fees | Reasonable fee capped by WAC 246-08-400 |
| Hospital liens | Who has a lien and on what | Hospitals, ambulance services, licensed practitioners |
| Hospital liens | Filing deadline | File within 20 days or before settlement and payment |
| Hospital liens | Cap | 25% of recovery |
| Hospital liens | Settlement and enforcement | Enforce within 1 year of filing |
| Medicaid liens | Subrogation and lien | Statutory lien for benefits paid |
| Medicaid liens | Allocation after Ahlborn | Agree with the agency or move in superior court |
| UIM | Stacking | Anti-stacking permitted |
| UIM | Written rejection | Written rejection required |
| UIM | Consent to settle and buyout | Consent-to-settle clause void; insurer may buy out |
| UIM | First-party bad faith notice (IFCA) | 20 days' notice before IFCA suit |
| Time-limited demands | Statute | No statute |
| Premises | Entrant categories | Invitee / licensee / trespasser |
| Premises | Duty to invitees | Restatement §§ 343, 343A |
| Premises | Recreational use | Recreational-use immunity |
| Damages caps | Non-economic damages | No statutory cap (RCW 4.56.250 repealed 2023) |
| Damages caps | Medical negligence | No cap in RCW ch. 7.70 |
| Damages caps | Punitive damages | Not allowed absent statute |
Statute of limitations and government claims
Washington sets its general personal-injury period in RCW 4.16.080, and medical negligence has its own statute in RCW 4.16.350. Claims against the state or a local government also need a pre-suit claim and a waiting period before suitSource 7: RCW 4.92.110Source 8 (4): RCW 4.96.020.
Personal injury
3 years
In Washington, an action for injury to the person must be commenced within three yearsSource 1 (2): RCW 4.16.080.
- When a Washington claim accrues, and the discovery rule, are case law.
Wrongful death
3 years
In Washington, the statute of limitations for a wrongful-death action is three years, the Washington Supreme Court said in Atchison v. Great Western Malting Co., citing RCW 4.16.080(2)Source 11 at 377: Atchison v. Great W. Malting Co., 161 Wn.2d 372 (2007)Source 1 (2): RCW 4.16.080. Washington's wrongful-death statute has no limitations period of its own; in White v. Johns-Manville Corp. the Court applied the three-year period of RCW 4.16.080(2) to a wrongful-death actionSource 12 at 348: White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 103 Wn.2d 344 (1985). When the death is alleged to result from health care, the Washington Supreme Court held that the medical-negligence limitations statute governs insteadSource 13: Fast v. Kennewick Pub. Hosp. Dist., 187 Wn.2d 27, 384 P.3d 232 (2016).
Property damage
3 years (personal property)
In Washington, an action for taking, detaining or injuring personal property, including an action for its specific recovery, must be commenced within three yearsSource 1 (2): RCW 4.16.080.
- Injury to real property is treated differently. In Washington, waste or trespass upon real property has its own three-year clauseSource 1 (1): RCW 4.16.080, and RCW 4.16.130 sets a two-year period for “an action for relief not hereinbefore provided for”Source 2: RCW 4.16.130. Which period applies to negligent injury to real property is a question of case law.
Medical negligence
3 years or 1 year from discovery
In Washington, a medical-negligence action must be commenced within three years of the act or omission or one year after the patient or the patient's representative discovered or reasonably should have discovered that the injury was caused by it, whichever period expires laterSource 4 (3): RCW 4.16.350. The statute also bars any action commenced more than eight years after the act or omission, and tolls the time on proof of fraud, intentional concealment or an unintended foreign bodySource 4 (3): RCW 4.16.350. In Washington, a written, good-faith request for mediation made before filing tolls the RCW 4.16.350 period for one yearSource 5: RCW 7.70.110.
- The Washington Supreme Court struck down an earlier version of the eight-year repose period in DeYoung v. Providence Medical CenterSource 14: DeYoung v. Providence Med. Ctr., 136 Wn.2d 136 (1998), and the Legislature reenacted it in 2006 for actions commenced on or after June 7, 2006 (2006 c 8 ss 301–302)Source 4 (notes): RCW 4.16.350. In Schroeder v. Weighall the Court said it was not reaching the validity of the reenacted repose periodSource 10: Schroeder v. Weighall, 179 Wn.2d 566, 316 P.3d 482 (2014).
Claims against the State of Washington
Claim + 60 days before suit
In Washington, a tort claim against the state or a state officer, employee or volunteer must first be presented to the office of risk management on the standard tort claim formSource 6 (1): RCW 4.92.100, and no action may be commenced until 60 calendar days after the claim is presentedSource 7: RCW 4.92.110. The limitations period is tolled during that 60-day period, and an action commenced within five court days after it ends is deemed to have been presented on the first day after itSource 7: RCW 4.92.110.
- The office of risk management is in the department of enterprise services, which posts the standard tort claim form on its websiteSource 6 (1): RCW 4.92.100Source 7: RCW 4.92.110.
- In 2026 the Washington Legislature considered E2SSB 6239, which would have amended RCW 4.92.110 and 4.96.020 as part of a process for adjudicating tort claims against the state and its political subdivisionsSource 16: E2SSB 6239, 69th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2026) (engrossed second substitute; not enacted). The bill passed the Senate on February 17, 2026 and was returned to the Senate Rules Committee on March 12, 2026; the Legislature's bill page showed no session law when checked on 10 Nov 2026Source 17: SB 6239 (2025–26), bill history.
Claims against local governments
Claim + 60 days before suit
In Washington, a tort action against a local governmental entity may not be commenced until 60 calendar days after the claim is presented to the entity's agent, and the limitations period is tolled during those 60 daysSource 8 (4): RCW 4.96.020. An action commenced within five court days after the 60 calendar days have elapsed is deemed to have been presented on the first day after that periodSource 8 (4): RCW 4.96.020.
- The grace period was added in 2009 (chapter 433, Laws of 2009, ESHB 1553), and the enacted text says “five court days”Source 9 § 1: 2009 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 433 (ESHB 1553). The Court of Appeals addressed how the tolling and grace periods combine in Rumburg v. Ferry County PUD No. 1, and a petition for review argued that the court placed the grace period after the extended limitations period rather than after the 60-day waitSource 15: Rumburg v. Ferry Cnty. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, No. 34572-6-III (Wash. Ct. App. 2017). In Washington, the governing body of each local governmental entity appoints an agent to receive claims, whose identity and address are recorded with the county auditor, and a claim is presented on the standard tort claim form or the entity's own formSource 8 (2)–(3): RCW 4.96.020.
Minors and incapacity
Tolled until 18
In Washington, the limitations period is tolled while the claimant is under 18, incompetent or disabled to the extent the statute describes, or imprisoned on a criminal charge before sentencingSource 3: RCW 4.16.190. The Washington Supreme Court held the former exception that removed minority tolling for medical-negligence claims unconstitutional under article I, section 12Source 10: Schroeder v. Weighall, 179 Wn.2d 566, 316 P.3d 482 (2014).
- RCW 4.16.190 once had a second subsection that excluded RCW 4.16.350 claims from minority tolling; the Legislature removed it in 2023Source 18 § 4: 2023 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 102 (SSB 5087), eff. July 23, 2023. RCW 4.16.350 itself still says that, “notwithstanding RCW 4.16.190, the knowledge of a custodial parent or guardian shall be imputed to a person under the age of eighteen years”Source 4: RCW 4.16.350.
Comparative fault and several liability
Washington uses pure comparative fault: a claimant's own fault reduces the recovery but does not bar itSource 19: RCW 4.22.005. Since the 1986 tort reform, liability among defendants is several only unless a statutory exception appliesSource 20 (1): RCW 4.22.070.
Fault model
Pure comparative fault
In Washington, contributory fault chargeable to the claimant diminishes proportionately the damages awarded but does not bar recoverySource 19: RCW 4.22.005.
Several liability as the default
Several only, with exceptions
In Washington, the trier of fact allocates fault among every entity that caused the claimant's damages, and each defendant's liability is several only, for its own proportionate shareSource 20 (1): RCW 4.22.070.
- RCW 4.22.070 was enacted in 1986 and last amended in 1993 (1993 c 496 s 1, effective July 1, 1993), according to the history note on the Legislature's site on 10 Nov 2026Source 20 (history note): RCW 4.22.070.
Immune employers and no-duty entities
In Washington, fault is not allocated to an entity immune from liability under Title 51 RCW (workers' compensation); the Washington Supreme Court reversed a trial court that let the jury assign fault to the plaintiff's immune employer, reading the 1993 amendments as removing immune employers from the allocationSource 20 (1): RCW 4.22.070Source 21: Edgar v. City of Tacoma (Wash. 1996). In Smelser v. Paul the Washington Supreme Court held that fault can be apportioned under RCW 4.22.070 only to an entity that committed a tort, so a parent owing no tort duty of supervision could not be assigned fault to reduce a child's recoverySource 22: Smelser v. Paul (Wash. 2017).
Fault-free claimant exception
Joint and several if claimant fault-free
In Washington, if the claimant or the person suffering bodily injury is found fault-free, defendants against whom judgment is entered are jointly and severally liable for the sum of their proportionate sharesSource 20 (1)(b): RCW 4.22.070.
- RCW 4.22.070 also keeps joint liability for persons acting in concert or as agent or servantSource 20 (1)(a): RCW 4.22.070, and leaves unaffected causes of action relating to hazardous wastes or substances, tortious interference with contracts or business relations, and generic fungible productsSource 20 (3): RCW 4.22.070.
Medical expenses: reasonable value and collateral sources
In Washington, no general paid-or-incurred statute was found. In ordinary negligence cases, case law measures medical damages by the reasonable value of the services and applies the common-law collateral source ruleSource 23 at 616: Hayes v. Wieber Enters., Inc., 105 Wn. App. 611 (2001). Medical-negligence cases are different: a statute lets any party present evidence that the plaintiff has already been compensated from most other sourcesSource 24: RCW 7.70.080.
Measure of medical damages
Reasonable value
In Washington, a negligence plaintiff may recover the reasonable value of the medical services received, not the total of all bills paid, and the Court of Appeals found no abuse of discretion in excluding evidence that a physician accepted the health insurer's lower payment as payment in full, where the physician testified the bill was reasonable and the defense offered no evidence to the contrarySource 23 at 616: Hayes v. Wieber Enters., Inc., 105 Wn. App. 611 (2001).
- This session found no Washington appellate holding after Hayes that decides whether write-offs or amounts actually paid are admissible or recoverable in an ordinary negligence case.
Medical-negligence collateral source statute
Collateral source evidence allowed in med-mal
In a Washington action for injury from health care, any party may present evidence to the trier of fact that the plaintiff has already been compensated for the injury from any source except the assets of the plaintiff, the plaintiff's representative or the plaintiff's immediate familySource 24: RCW 7.70.080. If that evidence is admitted, the plaintiff may present evidence of an obligation to repay the compensation and of any amount paid to secure the right to itSource 24: RCW 7.70.080.
- The Court of Appeals rejected a separation-of-powers challenge to RCW 7.70.080 as applied to past collateral payments, in a case where future collateral payments were excludedSource 25: Haskins v. MultiCare Health Sys., No. 44655-3-II (Wash. Ct. App.).
- Court filings describe Adcox v. Children's Orthopedic Hospital as holding that RCW 7.70.080 supersedes and replaces the common-law collateral source doctrine in medical-negligence casesSource 27: Adcox v. Children's Orthopedic Hosp. & Med. Ctr. (Wash. 1993). In Diaz v. State the Washington Supreme Court held that the trial court misapplied RCW 7.70.080 by letting nonsettling defendants introduce evidence of the plaintiff's settlement, and found the error harmlessSource 26: Diaz v. State, 175 Wn.2d 457, 285 P.3d 873 (2012).
Proving medical records and bills: RCW 5.45 and ER 904
In Washington, our research found no billing-affidavit statute like Texas § 18.001. Medical records come in as business records under RCW 5.45.020Source 28: RCW 5.45.020, and civil litigants use Evidence Rule 904 to pre-admit records and bills by notice before trialSource 29: Wash. ER 904.
Business records
Custodian or qualified witness
In Washington, a record of an act, condition or event is competent evidence if the custodian or another qualified witness testifies to its identity and mode of preparation, it was made in the regular course of business at or near the time, and the court finds the sources, method and time of preparation justify admissionSource 28: RCW 5.45.020.
- This session found an affidavit-in-lieu-of-testimony procedure for business records only in RCW 10.96.030, which applies to records produced under criminal process. No civil equivalent was found.
Reasonableness and necessity still need proof
Bills alone are not proof
In Washington, a negligence plaintiff must prove that medical costs were reasonable and cannot rely solely on medical records and bills; the Court of Appeals held it was error to admit bills as proof of past medical expenses, on a records custodian's testimony alone, without a showing that the treatment and the charges were necessary and reasonableSource 31 at 543: Patterson v. Horton, 84 Wn. App. 531, 929 P.2d 1125 (1997).
- No Washington statute that, like Texas Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 18.001, makes an affidavit sufficient evidence that medical charges were reasonable or necessary was located for this page. The search on 10 Nov 2026 covered RCW chapters 5.40, 5.44, 5.45 and 5.46 on the Legislature's site; court rules and other titles were not searched.
Medical record copy fees and response deadlines
Washington's Uniform Health Care Information Act sets the deadline for a provider to respond to a patient's request, and a Department of Health rule caps the feesSource 33 (1): RCW 70.02.080Source 34: WAC 246-08-400. In Washington, the fee caps are adjusted every two yearsSource 32 (40): RCW 70.02.010.
Response deadline
15 working days
In Washington, a provider must act on a patient's written request for health care information as promptly as required under the circumstances, but no later than 15 working days after receiving itSource 33 (1): RCW 70.02.080. If the information is in use or unusual circumstances have delayed the request, the provider must tell the patient and specify in writing the reasons for the delay and the earliest date, no later than 21 working days after receiving the request, when the information will be availableSource 33 (1)(d): RCW 70.02.080.
Fees
Reasonable fee capped by WAC 246-08-400
In Washington, a provider may charge a reasonable fee for providing health care information and is not required to permit examination or copying until the fee is paidSource 33 (2): RCW 70.02.080; “reasonable fee” is defined in RCW 70.02.010Source 32 (40): RCW 70.02.010, and the Department of Health rule lists the maximum search, handling and per-page chargesSource 34: WAC 246-08-400.
- WAC 246-08-400, as shown on the Legislature's site on 10 Nov 2026, caps copying at $1.24 per page for the first 30 pages and 94 cents per page for all other pages, and allows a $28 clerical fee for searching and handling. The latest filing in its history note is WSR 21-11-087, effective June 18, 2021Source 34 (1)–(2): WAC 246-08-400. The Washington statute sets base amounts of 65 cents, 50 cents and $15 and directs that they be adjusted biennially for the Seattle-Tacoma consumer price index as determined by the secretary of healthSource 32 (40): RCW 70.02.010. Check with the Washington Department of Health for any adjustment made after that filing.
- The Washington rule adds that HIPAA covered entities may not charge fees or costs that the federal HIPAA regulation, 45 C.F.R. pt. 164, does not authorize or prohibitsSource 34 (3): WAC 246-08-400. Federal HIPAA rules do not preempt more stringent state privacy law (45 C.F.R. § 160.203(b)).
Hospital, provider and ambulance liens
Washington's provider lien statute, RCW chapter 60.44, gives hospitals, ambulance services and licensed nurses, practitioners, physicians and surgeons a lien on a traumatically injured patient's claim against the tortfeasor, subject to a filing deadline and a capSource 35 §§ 60.44.010–.020: RCW ch. 60.44.
Who has a lien and on what
Hospitals, ambulance services, licensed practitioners
In Washington, every operator of an ambulance service or hospital, and every licensed nurse, practitioner, physician and surgeon, who renders service to a person who has received a traumatic injury has a lien for the value of the service on any claim, right of action or money to which the person is entitled against a tortfeasor or the tortfeasor's insurerSource 35 § 60.44.010: RCW ch. 60.44. The chapter does not apply to any claim, right of action or money accruing under the Washington workers' compensation actSource 35 § 60.44.010: RCW ch. 60.44.
Filing deadline
File within 20 days or before settlement and payment
In Washington, a provider is not entitled to the lien unless it files a notice of claim with the county auditor of the county where the service was performed within 20 days after the injury or the transportation or care, or, if settlement has not been accomplished and payment made to the injured person, at any time before that settlement and paymentSource 35 § 60.44.020(3): RCW ch. 60.44. The provider must also enforce the lien on its own behalf or through a collection agency licensed under chapter 19.16 RCW, and disclose its use of liens as part of its billing and collection practicesSource 35 § 60.44.020(1)–(2): RCW ch. 60.44.
- RCW 60.44.020 and 60.44.060 were last amended in 2015 (chapter 201, Laws of 2015)Source 35 §§ 60.44.020, 60.44.060 (history notes): RCW ch. 60.44.
Cap
25% of recovery
In Washington, all liens under chapter 60.44 for service rendered to one person as a result of one accident or event may not exceed 25 percent of the amount of the award, verdict, judgment or settlementSource 35 § 60.44.010: RCW ch. 60.44.
Settlement and enforcement
Enforce within 1 year of filing
In Washington, a settlement between the patient and the tortfeasor or insurer does not discharge a chapter 60.44 lien unless it provides for payment and discharge or a signed release or waiver is filedSource 35 § 60.44.050: RCW ch. 60.44. The lien may be enforced by a suit brought by the claimant or its assignee within one year after the lien is filedSource 35 § 60.44.060(1): RCW ch. 60.44.
Medicaid (Apple Health) recovery
Washington's Medicaid program has statutory subrogation and lien rights against a recipient's recovery from a liable third partySource 36 (1): RCW 74.09.180Source 38 (1)–(2): RCW 43.20B.060. Federal law limits the recoverable share, and Washington's statutes and rules should be read with that limit in mind.
Subrogation and lien
Statutory lien for benefits paid
In Washington, when a Medicaid recipient's injury is caused by the negligence or wrong of another, the state is subrogated to the recipient's rights against the tortfeasor or its insurer and has a lien on the recovery to the extent of the value of the assistance providedSource 36 (1): RCW 74.09.180Source 38 (1)–(2): RCW 43.20B.060. The lien is not effective against wrongful-death recoveries when the deceased has surviving dependentsSource 38 (2): RCW 43.20B.060. When the recovery comes through an action brought by or for the recipient, the amount paid to the state bears its proportionate share of attorney fees and costsSource 38 (4): RCW 43.20B.060.
No discharge without consent; funds held
In Washington, no settlement between the recipient and the tortfeasor or insurer discharges or compromises the lien without the express written consent of the secretarySource 37 (1): RCW 43.20B.050, and the portion of the recovery needed to satisfy the lien must be held in a trust account or the court registry until the lien is satisfiedSource 39 (2): RCW 43.20B.070.
Client notice and assignment rule
Under the Washington Health Care Authority rule, a client must assign to the state any right to payment from a liable third party for medical expenses, and the client or the client's legal representative must notify the agency in writing when filing a claim against a third party, commencing an action, negotiating a settlement or accepting an offerSource 40 (2), (6)(a): WAC 182-501-0100.
- The same Washington rule states that the doctrine of equitable subrogation does not apply to defeat, reduce or prorate the agency's recoverySource 40 (8): WAC 182-501-0100. The current text was filed July 23, 2025 and took effect August 23, 2025 (WSR 25-16-002)Source 40 (history note): WAC 182-501-0100.
Allocation after Ahlborn
Agree with the agency or move in superior court
Under federal Medicaid law, a state's lien on a recipient's settlement is limited to the portion that represents payment for medical careSource 42: Ark. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (2006). The Washington Health Care Authority rule requires the client or the client's legal representative to give the agency documentation proposing an allocation of damages, and, if the client and the agency cannot agree on the reimbursement amount, any party may move in superior court for a hearing to determine itSource 40 (6)(b)–(d): WAC 182-501-0100.
- Wilson v. State (Wash. 2000) upheld Washington's lien statutes against a federal-preemption challenge before Ahlborn was decidedSource 41: Wilson v. State (Wash. 2000), and a later Court of Appeals decision declined to let a recipient reopen a pre-Ahlborn lien settlement.
Underinsured motorist coverage
Washington's UIM statute, RCW 48.22.030, sets the coverage rules, and Washington Supreme Court case law sets the procedure when the insured wants to settle with the at-fault driverSource 43: RCW 48.22.030Source 44 at 728, 734: Hamilton v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 107 Wn.2d 721 (1987).
Stacking
Anti-stacking permitted
In Washington, the UIM statute lets a policy define its limit of liability as the maximum for all damages resulting from any one accident, regardless of the number of covered persons, claims made, or vehicles or premiums shown on the policy (an anti-stacking provision)Source 43 (5): RCW 48.22.030, and lets a policy provide that, when the injured person has other similar insurance available, the total limits of all coverages do not exceed the higher of the applicable limitsSource 43 (6): RCW 48.22.030.
Offset vs. excess
In Washington, an underinsured motor vehicle is defined by comparing the at-fault vehicle's liability coverage with the damages the covered person is legally entitled to recover: it includes a vehicle with no applicable liability bond or policy in effect, or with coverage that falls short of those damagesSource 43 (1): RCW 48.22.030. The Court of Appeals held that, under Hamilton, the UIM insurer is entitled to a setoff in the amount of the tortfeasor's full liability limitsSource 47: DeVany v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash. (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
Written rejection
Written rejection required
In Washington, UIM coverage is part of every automobile liability policy unless the named insured or spouse rejects all or part of it in writing; once rejected, it is not added to a supplemental or renewal policy unless the named insured or spouse later asks for it in writingSource 43 (2)–(4): RCW 48.22.030. The written-rejection requirement applies only to the original issuance of policies issued after July 24, 1983, not to a renewal or replacement policySource 43 (4): RCW 48.22.030. The Washington Supreme Court read the writing requirement to call for an affirmative and conscious act by the insuredSource 45: Clements, No. 58912-7 (Wash. 1993), and the Court of Appeals held that signing a form that expressly limited UIM to $60,000, knowing the higher limits available, was a written waiver of those limitsSource 46: Humleker v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 39947-4-II (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
Consent to settle and buyout
Consent-to-settle clause void; insurer may buy out
In Washington, a UIM policy provision that requires the insurer's consent before the insured settles with the tortfeasor is contrary to public policy and void, as the Washington Supreme Court restated in Hamilton v. Farmers Insurance Co. when describing its earlier holding in ElovichSource 44 at 728: Hamilton v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 107 Wn.2d 721 (1987). A UIM insurer that wants to keep subrogation rights against the tortfeasor's other assets may pay the underinsurance benefits before the release and substitute a payment to the insured equal to the settlement offerSource 44 at 734: Hamilton v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 107 Wn.2d 721 (1987).
- The notice an insured gives before settling, and how long the insurer has to substitute its payment, come from Hamilton and later Court of Appeals decisions, not from the statute.
First-party bad faith notice (IFCA)
20 days' notice before IFCA suit
Under Washington's Insurance Fair Conduct Act, a first-party claimant (including a UIM insured) must give written notice of the basis for the claim to the insurer and the Office of the Insurance Commissioner 20 days before filing suitSource 48 (8)(a): RCW 48.30.015. Notice is deemed received three business days after mailingSource 48 (8)(a): RCW 48.30.015.
- Under the Washington act, the court may increase the total award to as much as three times the actual damages, and must award reasonable attorney fees and litigation costs to a first-party claimant who prevailsSource 48 (2)–(3): RCW 48.30.015.
Time-limited demands and failure to settle
This session found no Washington statute that regulates time-limited or policy-limits settlement demands. A liability insurer's handling of a demand against its insured is governed by the common-law duty of good faithSource 49: Tank v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 105 Wn.2d 381 (1986).
Statute
No statute
No Washington statute governing the form or timing of time-limited or policy-limits settlement demands was located for this page.
- The search on 10 Nov 2026 covered RCW chapters 48.30 (unfair practices, including the Insurance Fair Conduct Act), 48.22 (casualty insurance), 48.18 (the insurance contract), 4.22 (contributory fault and settlement) and 4.84 (costs) on the Legislature's site. None sets requirements for a claimant's time-limited demand; RCW 4.84.280, on offers of settlement, applies to attorney-fee awards in damage actions of $10,000 or less. Other titles and pending bills were not searched.
Duty of good faith in defending and settling
In Washington, an insurer defending its insured owes a duty of good faith that the Washington Supreme Court describes as enhanced, including giving equal consideration to the insured's interests in settlementSource 49: Tank v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 105 Wn.2d 381 (1986).
Presumption of harm and coverage by estoppel
In Washington, when an insurer defending under a reservation of rights acts in bad faith, the insured's harm is presumed (the insurer may rebut it), and coverage by estoppel is an available remedySource 51: Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Butler, 118 Wn.2d 383, 823 P.2d 499 (1992). Later decisions limit the presumption: briefs cite St. Paul Fire & Marine v. Onvia for the view that it does not apply where there was no reservation of rights or failure to defendSource 52: St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Onvia, Inc., 165 Wn.2d 122 (2008).
- This session found no source applying the Butler presumption specifically to a failure-to-settle claim.
Covenant judgments
In Washington, when an insured settles with the claimant by a stipulated judgment, a covenant not to execute and an assignment of bad-faith claims, a covenant judgment found reasonable by the trial court is the measure of the insured's harm in the bad-faith actionSource 50: Besel v. Viking Ins. Co. of Wis. (Wash. 2002).
- The reasonableness hearing uses factors from Chaussee v. Maryland Casualty Co..
Premises claims
Washington keeps the common-law invitee, licensee and trespasser categories to set a landowner's duty, following the Restatement (Second) of TortsSource 53 at 662–63, 666: Younce v. Ferguson, 106 Wn.2d 658, 724 P.2d 991 (1986). A recreational-use statute limits landowner liability for free public recreationSource 57 (1): RCW 4.24.210.
Entrant categories
Invitee / licensee / trespasser
In Washington, the Supreme Court declined to abandon the invitee, licensee and trespasser classifications, which continue to determine the duty owed by an owner or occupier of land, and applied the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 332 definition of invitee that it had adopted in McKinnon v. Washington Federal Savings & Loan Ass'nSource 53 at 663, 666–67: Younce v. Ferguson, 106 Wn.2d 658, 724 P.2d 991 (1986).
- Tincani v. Inland Empire Zoological Society is cited in later briefs for the same framework: the possessor's duty differs for an invitee, a licensee and a trespasserSource 55: Tincani v. Inland Empire Zoological Soc'y, 124 Wn.2d 121 (1994).
Duty to invitees
Restatement §§ 343, 343A
In Washington, a possessor's liability to an invitee is measured by Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 343 and 343A, and an invitee's awareness of a dangerous condition does not necessarily preclude liability. In Iwai v. State, a parking-lot ice case, the lead opinion rejected the natural-accumulation rule and said those sections do not distinguish between natural and artificial conditions; four more justices concurred in that part of the opinion, and the Court affirmed the reversal of summary judgment for the defendantsSource 54 at 93–95, 103: Iwai v. State, 129 Wn.2d 84 (1996) (lead opinion of four justices; four more concurred in Part I). The Washington Supreme Court applied §§ 343 and 343A the same way in Eylander v. PrologisSource 56: Eylander v. Prologis (Wash. 2023).
Recreational use
Recreational-use immunity
In Washington, a landowner who allows members of the public to use land for outdoor recreation without charging a fee is not liable for unintentional injuries to those usersSource 57 (1): RCW 4.24.210, except for injuries caused by a known dangerous artificial latent condition for which warning signs were not conspicuously postedSource 57 (4)(a): RCW 4.24.210.
- The Washington Supreme Court read each of “known,” “dangerous,” “artificial” and “latent” as a separate element the plaintiff must prove about the injury-causing conditionSource 58: Jewels v. City of Bellingham (Wash. 2015).
Damages caps and punitive damages
Washington repealed its statutory cap on non-economic damages, RCW 4.56.250, in 2023Source 18 § 5: 2023 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 102 (SSB 5087), eff. July 23, 2023. The Washington Supreme Court had struck the cap down in 1989Source 59: Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wn.2d 636, 771 P.2d 711 (1989). Punitive damages are not available unless a statute expressly authorizes themSource 62 at 575: Dailey v. N. Coast Life Ins. Co., 129 Wn.2d 572 (1996).
Non-economic damages
No statutory cap (RCW 4.56.250 repealed 2023)
In Washington, the former statutory limit on non-economic damages, RCW 4.56.250, was repealed in 2023Source 18 § 5: 2023 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 102 (SSB 5087), eff. July 23, 2023Source 60: RCW 4.56.250 (former), RCW dispositions, ch. 4.56. Before the repeal, the Washington Supreme Court had held the limit to violate the right to a jury trial under article I, section 21 of the Washington ConstitutionSource 59: Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wn.2d 636, 771 P.2d 711 (1989).
- The repeal was made by Substitute Senate Bill 5087 (chapter 102, Laws of 2023, effective July 23, 2023). The Washington Legislature's final bill report describes the bill as repealing or amending sections “held unconstitutional by the Washington State Supreme Court”Source 61: S.S.B. 5087, 68th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2023), Final Bill Report.
Medical negligence
No cap in RCW ch. 7.70
In Washington, no limit on the amount of damages appears in RCW chapter 7.70, the chapter on actions for injuries resulting from health care, as it read on the Legislature's site on 10 Nov 2026Source 63: RCW ch. 7.70 (actions for injuries resulting from health care), and the general limit on non-economic damages, RCW 4.56.250, was repealed in 2023Source 60: RCW 4.56.250 (former), RCW dispositions, ch. 4.56. One limit applies in voluntary arbitration under RCW chapter 7.70A, which is used only if all parties elect it: the arbitrator may not award more than one million dollars for economic and non-economic damages togetherSource 64 §§ 7.70A.020(1)(a), 7.70A.060(2): RCW ch. 7.70A (voluntary arbitration of health care claims).
- No other Washington cap specific to medical-negligence damages was located for this page. The search on 10 Nov 2026 covered RCW chapters 7.70, 7.70A and 4.56; other titles were not searched.
Punitive damages
Not allowed absent statute
In Washington, punitive damages are not recoverable without express legislative authorization; the Washington Supreme Court applied that rule to hold them unavailable under the Law Against DiscriminationSource 62 at 574–75: Dailey v. N. Coast Life Ins. Co., 129 Wn.2d 572 (1996).
- Some statutes authorize enhanced or treble damages, for example IFCASource 48 (2): RCW 48.30.015. Which other Washington statutes authorize punitive damages in injury cases.
General information for plaintiff-side law firms, not legal advice. Washington law changes: check the current statute and case law before relying on this page.
Sources
RCW 4.16.080 · Washington State Legislature, Revised Code of Washington (app.leg.wa.gov; RCW index page reads “Last update: July 15, 2026”)
“The following actions shall be commenced within three years: … An action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including an action for the specific recovery thereof, or for any other injury to the person or rights of another not hereinafter enumerated;”
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RCW 4.16.130 · Washington State Legislature, Revised Code of Washington (app.leg.wa.gov; RCW index page reads “Last update: July 15, 2026”)
“An action for relief not hereinbefore provided for, shall be commenced within two years after the cause of action shall have accrued.”
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RCW 4.16.190 · Washington State Legislature, Revised Code of Washington (app.leg.wa.gov; RCW index page reads “Last update: July 15, 2026”)
“be at the time the cause of action accrued either under the age of eighteen years, or incompetent or disabled to such a degree that he or she cannot understand the nature of the proceedings, … or imprisoned on a criminal charge prior to sentencing, the time of such disability shall not be a part of the time limited for the commencement of action.”
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RCW 4.16.350 · Washington State Legislature, Revised Code of Washington (app.leg.wa.gov; RCW index page reads “Last update: July 15, 2026”)
“shall be commenced within three years of the act or omission alleged to have caused the injury or condition, or one year of the time the patient or his or her representative discovered or reasonably should have discovered that the injury or condition was caused by said act or omission, whichever period expires later, except that in no event shall an action be commenced more than eight years after said act or omission”
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RCW 7.70.110 · Washington State Legislature, Revised Code of Washington (app.leg.wa.gov; RCW index page reads “Last update: July 15, 2026”)
“The making of a written, good faith request for mediation of a dispute related to damages for injury occurring as a result of health care prior to filing a cause of action under this chapter shall toll the statute of limitations provided in RCW 4.16.350 for one year.”
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RCW 4.92.100 · Washington State Legislature, Revised Code of Washington (app.leg.wa.gov; RCW index page reads “Last update: July 15, 2026”)
“All claims against the state, or against the state's officers, employees, or volunteers, acting in such capacity, for damages arising out of tortious conduct, must be presented to the office of risk management.”
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RCW 4.92.110 · Washington State Legislature, Revised Code of Washington (app.leg.wa.gov; RCW index page reads “Last update: July 15, 2026”)
“until sixty calendar days have elapsed after the claim is presented to the office of risk management in the department of enterprise services. The applicable period of limitations within which an action must be commenced shall be tolled during the sixty calendar day period. For the purposes of the applicable period of limitations, an action commenced within five court days after the sixty calendar day period has elapsed is deemed to have been presented on the first day after the sixty calendar day period elapsed.”
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RCW 4.96.020 · Washington State Legislature, Revised Code of Washington (app.leg.wa.gov; RCW index page reads “Last update: July 15, 2026”)
“until sixty calendar days have elapsed after the claim has first been presented to the agent of the governing body thereof. The applicable period of limitations within which an action must be commenced shall be tolled during the sixty calendar day period. For the purposes of the applicable period of limitations, an action commenced within five court days after the sixty calendar day period has elapsed is deemed to have been presented on the first day after the sixty calendar day period elapsed.”
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2009 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 433 (ESHB 1553) · Washington State Legislature, bill documents (lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov)
“an action commenced within five court days after the sixty calendar day period has elapsed”
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Schroeder v. Weighall, 179 Wn.2d 566, 316 P.3d 482 (2014) · Washington Supreme Court
Atchison v. Great W. Malting Co., 161 Wn.2d 372 (2007) · Caselaw Access Project, Harvard Law School Library (reporter text; read in full 2026-11-10)
“The statute of limitations for a wrongful death action in Washington is three years.”
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White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 103 Wn.2d 344 (1985) · Caselaw Access Project, Harvard Law School Library (reporter text; read in full 2026-11-10)
“Washington's wrongful death statute does not contain an express statute of limitation; rather, it is governed by RCW 4.16, which sets forth the statutes of limitation applicable to different types of actions. … The 3-year tort statute of limitation (RCW 4.16.080(2)) applies to the present action.”
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Fast v. Kennewick Pub. Hosp. Dist., 187 Wn.2d 27, 384 P.3d 232 (2016) · Washington Supreme Court
DeYoung v. Providence Med. Ctr., 136 Wn.2d 136 (1998) · Washington Supreme Court
Rumburg v. Ferry Cnty. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, No. 34572-6-III (Wash. Ct. App. 2017) · Washington Court of Appeals
E2SSB 6239, 69th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2026) (engrossed second substitute; not enacted) · Washington State Legislature, bill documents (lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov)
“AN ACT Relating to establishing a process for adjudicating tort claims against the state of Washington and its political subdivisions;”
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SB 6239 (2025–26), bill history · Washington State Legislature, bill summary (status as of November 9, 2026)
“By resolution, returned to Senate Rules Committee for third reading.”
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2023 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 102 (SSB 5087), eff. July 23, 2023 · Washington State Legislature, bill documents (lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov)
“RCW 4.56.250 (Claims for noneconomic damages—Limitation) and 1986 c 305 s 301 are each repealed.”
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RCW 4.22.005 · Washington State Legislature, Revised Code of Washington (app.leg.wa.gov; RCW index page reads “Last update: July 15, 2026”)
“any contributory fault chargeable to the claimant diminishes proportionately the amount awarded as compensatory damages for an injury attributable to the claimant's contributory fault, but does not bar recovery.”
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RCW 4.22.070 · Washington State Legislature, Revised Code of Washington (app.leg.wa.gov; RCW index page reads “Last update: July 15, 2026”)
“The liability of each defendant shall be several only and shall not be joint except: … If the trier of fact determines that the claimant or party suffering bodily injury or incurring property damages was not at fault, the defendants against whom judgment is entered shall be jointly and severally liable for the sum of their proportionate shares”
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Edgar v. City of Tacoma (Wash. 1996) · Washington Supreme Court
Smelser v. Paul (Wash. 2017) · Washington Supreme Court
Hayes v. Wieber Enters., Inc., 105 Wn. App. 611 (2001) · Caselaw Access Project, Harvard Law School Library (reporter text; read in full 2026-11-10)
“Plaintiffs in negligence cases are permitted to recover the reasonable value of the medical services they receive, not the total of all bills paid. … The fact that the doctor accepted the first party insurance carrier’s limit for his services does not tend to prove his charge for these services was unreasonable.”
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RCW 7.70.080 · Washington State Legislature, Revised Code of Washington (app.leg.wa.gov; RCW index page reads “Last update: July 15, 2026”)
“Any party may present evidence to the trier of fact that the plaintiff has already been compensated for the injury complained of from any source except the assets of the plaintiff, the plaintiff's representative, or the plaintiff's immediate family.”
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Haskins v. MultiCare Health Sys., No. 44655-3-II (Wash. Ct. App.) · Washington Court of Appeals
Diaz v. State, 175 Wn.2d 457, 285 P.3d 873 (2012) · Washington Supreme Court
Adcox v. Children's Orthopedic Hosp. & Med. Ctr. (Wash. 1993) · Washington Supreme Court
RCW 5.45.020 · Washington State Legislature, Revised Code of Washington (app.leg.wa.gov; RCW index page reads “Last update: July 15, 2026”)
“A record of an act, condition or event, shall in so far as relevant, be competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the regular course of business, at or near the time of the act, condition or event, and if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of information, method and time of preparation were such as to justify its admission.”
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Wash. ER 904 · Washington Courts
In re Proposed Amendments to ER 904, Order No. 25700-A-1667 (Wash. Nov. 5, 2025) (published for comment) · Washington Supreme Court
Patterson v. Horton, 84 Wn. App. 531, 929 P.2d 1125 (1997) · Caselaw Access Project, Harvard Law School Library (reporter text; read in full 2026-11-10)
“Thus, the plaintiff must prove that medical costs were reasonable and, in doing so, cannot rely solely on medical records and bills. … In other words, medical records and bills are relevant to prove past medical expenses only if supported by additional evidence that the treatment and the bills were both necessary and reasonable.”
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RCW 70.02.010 · Washington State Legislature, Revised Code of Washington (app.leg.wa.gov; RCW index page reads “Last update: July 15, 2026”)
“"Reasonable fee" means the charges for duplicating or searching the record, but shall not exceed 65 cents per page for the first 30 pages and 50 cents per page for all other pages. In addition, a clerical fee for searching and handling may be charged not to exceed $15. These amounts shall be adjusted biennially in accordance with changes in the consumer price index, all consumers, for Seattle-Tacoma metropolitan statistical area as determined by the secretary of health.”
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RCW 70.02.080 · Washington State Legislature, Revised Code of Washington (app.leg.wa.gov; RCW index page reads “Last update: July 15, 2026”)
“a health care provider, as promptly as required under the circumstances, but no later than fifteen working days after receiving the request shall: … the health care provider may charge a reasonable fee for providing the health care information and is not required to permit examination or copying until the fee is paid.”
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WAC 246-08-400 · Washington State Legislature, Washington Administrative Code (app.leg.wa.gov; “The online version of the WAC is updated twice a month”)
“No more than one dollar and twenty-four cents per page for the first thirty pages; … No more than ninety-four cents per page for all other pages. … The provider can charge a twenty-eight dollar clerical fee for searching and handling records;”
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RCW ch. 60.44 · Washington State Legislature, Revised Code of Washington (app.leg.wa.gov; RCW index page reads “Last update: July 15, 2026”)
“shall have a lien upon any claim, right of action, and/or money to which such person is entitled against any tort-feasor and/or insurer of such tort-feasor for the value of such service … shall not exceed twenty-five percent of the amount of an award, verdict, report, decision, decree, judgment, or settlement. … Within twenty days after the date of such injury or receipt of transportation or care, or, if settlement has not been accomplished and payment made to such injured person, then at any time before such settlement and payment, files for record with the county auditor … Such lien may be enforced by a suit at law brought by the claimant or his or her assignee within one year after the filing of such lien”
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RCW 74.09.180 · Washington State Legislature, Revised Code of Washington (app.leg.wa.gov; RCW index page reads “Last update: July 15, 2026”)
“the authority shall thereby be subrogated to the recipient's rights against the recovery had from any tort feasor or the tort feasor's insurer, or both, and shall have a lien thereupon to the extent of the value of the assistance furnished by the authority.”
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RCW 43.20B.050 · Washington State Legislature, Revised Code of Washington (app.leg.wa.gov; RCW index page reads “Last update: July 15, 2026”)
“No settlement made by and between the recipient and tort feasor and/or insurer shall discharge or otherwise compromise the lien created in RCW 43.20B.060 without the express written consent of the secretary.”
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RCW 43.20B.060 · Washington State Legislature, Revised Code of Washington (app.leg.wa.gov; RCW index page reads “Last update: July 15, 2026”)
“the department shall be subrogated to the recipient's rights against a tort feasor or the tort feasor's insurer, or both. … The department shall have a lien upon any recovery by or on behalf of the recipient from such tort feasor or the tort feasor's insurer, or both to the extent of the value of the assistance paid or residential care provided by the department, provided that such lien shall not be effective against recoveries subject to wrongful death when there are surviving dependents of the deceased.”
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RCW 43.20B.070 · Washington State Legislature, Revised Code of Washington (app.leg.wa.gov; RCW index page reads “Last update: July 15, 2026”)
“The proceeds from any recovery made pursuant to any action or claim described in RCW 43.20B.060 that is necessary to fully satisfy the department's lien against recovery shall be placed in a trust account or in the registry of the court until the department's lien is satisfied.”
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WAC 182-501-0100 · Washington State Legislature, Washington Administrative Code (app.leg.wa.gov; “The online version of the WAC is updated twice a month”)
“The client or the client's legal representative must notify the agency in writing when filing any claim against a third party, commencing an action at law, negotiating a settlement, or accepting an offer from the liable third party. … If the client and the agency cannot agree upon the appropriate reimbursement amount, any party may bring a motion in superior court for a hearing to determine the amount of reimbursement to the agency from settlement or judgment proceeds. … The doctrine of equitable subrogation does not apply to defeat, reduce, or prorate any recovery made by the agency based on its assignment, lien, or subrogation rights.”
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Wilson v. State (Wash. 2000) · Washington Supreme Court
Ark. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (2006) · Supreme Court of the United States
RCW 48.22.030 · Washington State Legislature, Revised Code of Washington (app.leg.wa.gov; RCW index page reads “Last update: July 15, 2026”)
“A named insured or spouse may reject, in writing, underinsured coverage for bodily injury or death, or property damage, and the requirements of subsections (2) and (3) of this section shall not apply. … The limit of liability under the policy coverage may be defined as the maximum limits of liability for all damages resulting from any one accident regardless of the number of covered persons, claims made, or vehicles or premiums shown on the policy, or premiums paid, or vehicles involved in an accident.”
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Hamilton v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 107 Wn.2d 721 (1987) · Caselaw Access Project, Harvard Law School Library (reporter text; read in full 2026-11-10)
“we held that a provision within an underinsured motorist policy which requires consent of the insurer before an injured insured may settle with a tortfeasor is contrary to public policy and is void. … it may secure its subrogation rights by substituting a payment to the insured in an amount equal to the settlement offer.”
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Clements, No. 58912-7 (Wash. 1993) · Washington Supreme Court
Humleker v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 39947-4-II (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) · Washington Court of Appeals
DeVany v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash. (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) · Washington Court of Appeals
RCW 48.30.015 · Washington State Legislature, Revised Code of Washington (app.leg.wa.gov; RCW index page reads “Last update: July 15, 2026”)
“Twenty days prior to filing an action based on this section, a first party claimant must provide written notice of the basis for the cause of action to the insurer and office of the insurance commissioner. … The insurer and insurance commissioner are deemed to have received notice three business days after the notice is mailed.”
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Tank v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 105 Wn.2d 381 (1986) · Washington Supreme Court
Besel v. Viking Ins. Co. of Wis. (Wash. 2002) · Washington Supreme Court
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Butler, 118 Wn.2d 383, 823 P.2d 499 (1992) · Washington Supreme Court
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Onvia, Inc., 165 Wn.2d 122 (2008) · Washington Supreme Court
Younce v. Ferguson, 106 Wn.2d 658, 724 P.2d 991 (1986) · Caselaw Access Project, Harvard Law School Library (reporter text; read in full 2026-11-10)
“Common law classifications continue to determine the duty owed by an owner or occupier of land in Washington.”
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Iwai v. State, 129 Wn.2d 84 (1996) (lead opinion of four justices; four more concurred in Part I) · Caselaw Access Project, Harvard Law School Library (reporter text; read in full 2026-11-10)
“An invitee’s awareness of a particular dangerous condition does not necessarily preclude landowner liability. … The standards imposed by these sections do not distinguish between artificial and natural conditions”
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Tincani v. Inland Empire Zoological Soc'y, 124 Wn.2d 121 (1994) · Washington Supreme Court
Eylander v. Prologis (Wash. 2023) · Washington Supreme Court
RCW 4.24.210 · Washington State Legislature, Revised Code of Washington (app.leg.wa.gov; RCW index page reads “Last update: July 15, 2026”)
“shall not be liable for unintentional injuries to such users. … Nothing in this section shall prevent the liability of a landowner or others in lawful possession and control for injuries sustained to users by reason of a known dangerous artificial latent condition for which warning signs have not been conspicuously posted.”
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Jewels v. City of Bellingham (Wash. 2015) · Washington Supreme Court
Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wn.2d 636, 771 P.2d 711 (1989) · Washington Supreme Court
RCW 4.56.250 (former), RCW dispositions, ch. 4.56 · Washington State Legislature, Revised Code of Washington (app.leg.wa.gov; RCW index page reads “Last update: July 15, 2026”)
“Claims for noneconomic damages—Limitation. [1986 c 305 § 301.] Repealed by 2023 c 102 § 5.”
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S.S.B. 5087, 68th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2023), Final Bill Report · Washington State Legislature, bill documents (lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov)
“The following sections of statutory law that were held unconstitutional by the Washington State Supreme Court are repealed or amended:”
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Dailey v. N. Coast Life Ins. Co., 129 Wn.2d 572 (1996) · Caselaw Access Project, Harvard Law School Library (reporter text; read in full 2026-11-10)
“We instead hold punitive damages are unavailable under the Law Against Discrimination (LAD), RCW 49.60. … Governing resolution of this case is the court’s long-standing rule prohibiting punitive damages without express legislative authorization.”
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RCW ch. 7.70 (actions for injuries resulting from health care) · Washington State Legislature, Revised Code of Washington (app.leg.wa.gov; RCW index page reads “Last update: July 15, 2026”)
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RCW ch. 7.70A (voluntary arbitration of health care claims) · Washington State Legislature, Revised Code of Washington (app.leg.wa.gov; RCW index page reads “Last update: July 15, 2026”)
“The dispute will be submitted to arbitration under this chapter only if all parties to the action elect to submit the dispute to arbitration. … The arbitrator may not make an award of damages under this chapter that exceeds one million dollars for both economic and noneconomic damages.”
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